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Denis Dutton’s The Art Instinct: Beauty, Pleasure,
and Human Evolution is not the first recent work to
recognize our need for a new theory of art. But the
theory it presents is probably the most ambitious and
far-reaching, seeking to connect our cravings for art
and our repeatedly astonishing—“unimaginable” is
his word—successes in artistic production, apprecia-
tion, and theorization on the one hand, with physical
survival as a species, personal success on the individ-
ual level, and evolutionary theory (both biology and
psychology) on the other.
In doing this, of course, Dutton takes on a number
ofHerculean tasks.He sorts out any number of famil-
iar problems in aesthetics, often case based, such as
the comparison of art and language, why plots exist,
intention in the arts, communication and expression
in arts and language, the role of freedom in art, the
nature and importance of representation and of craft,
kitsch, forgery, and plagiarism, theory of conspicu-
ous waste and consumption, and irony. He attempts
to wean us from our seemingly insatiable fascination
with modernism and Duchamp’s Fountain.
He attacks our unswerving devotion to cultural
constructionism. It is not so much that cultural con-
structionism is wrong, for cultural variation is ir-
refutable (he provides any number of examples from
all sorts of cultures, chapter 4 and passim). But the
social constructions, he argues, are theoretically sub-
ordinate to and historically derivative of larger, and
far far deeper, similarities, and it is these similari-
ties, amounting to dimensions of human nature, to
which theory of art must attend. From the stand-
point of an appropriate level of abstraction, twelve
cluster criteria can be identified that define art as
a universal, cross-cultural category (pp. 51–52). He
concludes that “at the heart of [social construction-
ism and many modernist] arguments lies a fatal non
sequitur: while it is true that culture sanctions and ha-
bituates a wide variety of aesthetic tastes, it does not
follow that culture can give us a taste for just anything
at all” (p. 205). “Human nature, so evolutionary aes-
thetics insists, sets limits on what culture and the arts
can accomplish with the human personality and its
tastes. Contingent facts about human nature ensure
not only that some things in the arts will be difficult
to appreciate but that appreciation of them may be
impossible” (p. 206).
He sketches a new theory of mind (including con-
tinuing the monstrous job of sorting out conscious
dimensions from unconscious) that is based on sex-
ual selection (pp. 150–151) and in which art and aes-
thetic preferences have essential and fundamental
roles: “From the Greeks through the Enlightenment
and on into the computer age, every prevailing anal-
ogy for the mind has captured some important as-
pect or function. But none even begins to explain the
mind as the creative, exuberant, imaginative, roman-
tic, wasteful, storytelling, witty, loquacious, poetic,
ideology-inventing organ it also is. Darwin’sDescent
of Man, by regarding the mind as a sexual ornament,
presents us with a first step toward explaining those
features of the human personality that we find most
charming, captivating, and seductive. Adding sexual
selection to natural selection, we begin at last to see
the possibility for a complete theory of the origin of
the arts” (pp. 151–152).
His project demands that he wrest the philoso-
phy of art from the strangleholds of Plato and Kant,
though he retains, and makes much of, Kant’s “disin-
terestedness” as what he terms “special focus.” This
is Characteristic 7 on the list of twelve: “Works of
art and artistic performances tend to be bracketed
off from ordinary life, made a separate and dramatic
focus of experience” (pp. 55–56).
Along the way, he corrects a number of persistent
errors in interpretation (of Veblen, for instance), all
the while providing the most amusing examples (the-
oretical and empirical, from a number of disciplines),
trenchant statistics, and penetrating insight into both
the arts and the human condition. He raises more
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questions than he answers, of course, but that is to be
expected. It will take quite some time—and work in
a number of disciplines in addition to philosophical
aesthetics—to answer his intriguing questions and to
work out the implications and ramifications of the
new theory.
He’s no Kant (thank heaven). Yet disappointment
in his lack in rigorous systematization is more than
made up for by his elegant, easy-to-read style, full
of lively examples and vivid insights from personal
experience. The downside of this is that he has not
traced out the full implications of the work, much
less given us full proof. Most professional readers
will be frustrated, especially within the areas of their
expertise. Aestheticians must take this frustration in
stride and do much of the dirty work ourselves, ex-
ploring, testing, and filling out the theory as it applies
to the various subareas. And, of course, we will look
forward to further explication by Dutton himself.
Dutton’s project is complex: first, the outlining and
justification of a new theory of aesthetic preference
and art and their roles in human life (conscious and
not), a theory that integrates these forces with the
theory of evolution and shows how they are adaptive,
and second, “the elucidat[ion of] general character-
istics of the arts in terms of evolved adaptations” (p.
236). In the process he also establishes cross-cultural
criteria for art (in chapter 3).Within “art” he includes
both “what might be dismissed as low-end popular
art” (p. 236). In the process he also establishes cross-
cultural criteria for art (in chapter 3). His argument,
which draws on an extensive literature in evolution-
ary biology, evolutionary psychology, anthropology,
economics, and linguistics as well as philosophy, has
three major parts: natural selection, landscape pref-
erence, and the arts; sexual selection and the arts; and
explorationof someof the implications of natural and
sexual selection for philosophy of art (including but
not limited to traditional problems).
Following the body of literature on experiments
on aesthetic preference for landscape (developed
largely during the 1990s), he shows (in chapter 1)
“how innate interests and emotional reactions to
natural landscapes impinge on tastes many people
have assumed to be merely cultural. The Pleistocene
heritage affects landscape painting, calendar choices,
and the design of parks and golf courses [and gardens,
one might add]. It is wrong, however, to regard these
modern phenomena as by-products of prehistoric
impulses or emotions: rather, they directly address
and satisfy ancient, persistent interests and longings”
(pp. 100–101). The importance of natural selection
is developed in relation to other aesthetic prefer-
ences, to arts, especially fiction, and to language in
chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5 tackles the question, Are
“the arts in their various forms adaptations in their
own right, or are they better understood as modern
by-products of adaptations?” (p. 86); Dutton con-
cludes they are actual adaptations.
But natural selection alone cannot account for the
arts. For that we need the theory of sexual selec-
tion, which accounts for the evolutionary elabora-
tion of individuality and personality, as well as for
cross-cultural preferences for originality and individ-
uality (chapter 7) and interest in artistic intention
(p. 170). It is at this level that biology, arts, and so-
ciety become mutually reinforcing: “the qualities of
mind chosen and thus evolved in this process of hu-
man self-domestication made for enduring pairings,
the rearing of children who themselves might sur-
vive, and thus the creation of robust social groups”
(p. 151). “How does resource-demonstration work in
courtship?” (p. 153) becomes, perhaps for the first
time, a vital question for philosophical aesthetics.
Data—the biological distinctions between male
and female and the differences between masculine
and feminine—that in others’ hands have constituted
an attack on feminism, or women, are contextualized
in such a way that feminists need not gag. Dutton
avoids reductionism. Nor does his emphasis on evo-
lutionary biology as the source of mind lead him to
determinism. As he puts it: “[T]here is no reason
to accept that we are doomed forever to respond to
art in terms of costliness, conspicuous waste, or its
bearing on social status. Pleistocene landscape pref-
erences are just as innate but need not control our
tastes in landscape painting or even our choice of a
calendar. Once we understand and know an impulse,
we can choose to go along with it or we can resist it.
There are elements in the art world as described by
Veblen—for instance, the intimate association of art
with money—that ought to disturb us. But better we
should know this devil than deny it or pretend it is but
a product of capitalism” (p. 161). Dutton’s claim (in
the context of a discussion of Veblen’s theory) that
the choice we have as to whether to follow blindly
either biologically or culturally induced aesthetic or
artistic preferences is ultimately liberating—and cru-
cial to making this a useful theory.
The final chapter returns to four of the origi-
nal twelve cluster criteria, examining how they re-
veal themselves “in the very greatest works of art,
the masterpieces that have withstood Hume’s Test
of Time and show every indication of maintaining
their hold on the human imagination . . . four pri-
mary properties that we tend to find in the great-
est art: high complexity, serious thematic content,
a sense of insistent or urgent purpose, and a dis-
tance from ordinary human pleasures and desires”
(p. 236).
This is not to say that there are no criticisms.
Although extensively referenced, particularly in re-
gard to the classics of philosophy, Arthur Danto, and
evolutionary theory and psychology, his references
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regarding the relations between evolutionary biol-
ogy, evolutionary psychology, and environmental-
preference aesthetics include nothing more recent
than the references I used sixteen years ago for a
similar argument regarding environmental aesthet-
ics in The Garden as an Art (SUNY Press, 1993):
Jay Appleton’s essential The Experience of Land-
scape (John Wiley, 1975) and the work of John D.
Balling and John H. Falk, Roger S. Ulrich, Stephen
and Rachel Kaplan, and Gordon H. Orians and Ju-
dith H. Heerwagen. (The bibliography onmore com-
mon aesthetics issues is more up-to-date.) There is
no mention of the recent work on palaeolithic art,
like David Lewis-Williams’s The Mind in the Cave:
Consciousness and the Origins of Art (Thames and
Hudson, 2004), or theory about the selective advan-
tage conferred by Stone Age campsite selection.
More troublesome, Dutton does not mention,
much less analyze (nor even cite in the bibliogra-
phy), the deep body of work by new philosophers
over the past fifteen years that is directly relevant to
his topics and arguments. This includes not only work
on evolution and landscape preference such as The
Garden as an Art and Stephanie Ross’s What Gar-
dens Mean (University of Chicago Press, 1989) but
also Emily Brady’sAesthetics of the Natural Environ-
ment (University of Alabama Press, 2003; reviewed
JAAC 62 [2004]); Malcolm Budd’s The Aesthetic Ap-
preciation of Nature (Oxford University Press, 2002;
reviewed JAAC 62 [2004]); The Aesthetics of Human
Environments, edited by Arnold Berleant and Allen
Carlson (Broadview Press, 2007); and the essays in
JAAC’s “Special Issue onEnvironmentalAesthetics”
56 (1998), with JohnAndrewFisher’s “What theHills
AreAliveWith: InDefense of the Sounds of Nature”
(this last highly relevant, givenDutton’s relatively ex-
tensive discussion of sound and music). A happy ex-
ception is Larry Shiner and Yulia Kriskovets’s “The
Aesthetics of Smelly Art,” JAAC 65 (2007), which
Dutton challenges (p. 205). Taking into account at
least some of this recent work would have served
his arguments well—and in addition been a service
to the discipline, which is here misrepresented. And
even unwitting erasure of scholarly work damages
the field: careers languish, while eventually other
scholars unwittingly waste energy and time repro-
ducing their work.
Further amplification of his own research among
the artists of the Sepik Valley would have been wel-
come. (I searched in vain among his website bibli-
ographies for indications this had been thoroughly
dealt with elsewhere. His article on tribal art is not
fully satisfactory in this regard!)His cursory dismissal
of symbolism as an “explanatory fifth wheel” (p. 130)
is slapdash and uncharacteristically reductive, partic-
ularly in this context, as is his underestimation and
even misinterpretation of Jung, who could be singu-
larly useful in explaining symbolism, narrative, and
a number of other issues. Joseph Campbell’s elabo-
ration of Jung’s theory of the symbolic significance
and functioning of mandalas for preliterate, hunting–
gathering peoples would seem to be directly to the
point. It is something of a surprise in someone as vi-
sually astute and sensitive as Dutton to find such a
strong preference for language over visual art, first
as offering “the best picture we can have of the hu-
man soul” (p. 162; pace Wittgenstein, who argues
for the body), and second as a precisely cognitive
resource.
Given the importance Dutton (rightly) ascribes to
emotion in evolution, human life, and philosophy of
the arts, his cursory treatment of emotions does his
argument a disservice. Simply referring to Paul Ek-
man’s list of allegedly universal human emotional ex-
pressions, from his Emotions Revealed (Henry Holt,
2003), covers up too many issues. There is no final
agreement as to the number or identity of even the
very limited list of allegedly universal emotions such
as fear and anger, even within the Western scien-
tific community, much less across cultures. And Ek-
man’s and Dutton’s approach, in which emotion is
identified with biological events and states, which he
adopts explicitly early in the book, appears insuffi-
cient to account for the role he attributes to emotion
in the arts. If all there is to emotion is the biologi-
cal reaction to the perception of a threat or induce-
ment to survival, why does art have to get involved at
all?
This approach to emotion also ignores the pro-
found differences cross-culturally in the interpre-
tation of the biological emotion (yes, everyone is
capable of feeling biologically defined fear, as are
mammals in general—but we understand timidity
differently from terror or horror or ordinary fear,
even if an aroused adrenal system and fight-or-
flight response characterize all four). It also over-
looks differences in the values ascribed by different
cultures both to the various shades of the “same”
biological emotion and to their manifestation un-
der different circumstances (or by individuals of
different categories). The Japanese philosopher Ya-
suo Yuasa, in his The Body, Self-Cultivation, and
Ki-Energy (SUNY Press, 1993), lists seven basic
emotions (which he derives from Eastern medicine),
including anger, fear, surprise, joy (presumably Ek-
man’s happiness), and sorrow (Ekman’s sadness), but
the last two are completely different: anxiety and
longing, rather than Ekman’s “disgust or contempt”
(p. 190). There is a literature on this. Robert Solomon
is a good place to start. Paolo Santangelo’s edited
volume Expressions of States of Mind in Asia: Pro-
ceedings of the INALCO-UNO Workshop Held in
Naples, 27th May 2000 (Universita` degli studi di
Napoli L’Orientale, 2004), which focuses on the
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interpretation of emotion and relies heavily on anal-
ysis of arts, provides a valuable introduction to the
issues as they appear in Asia. Although the idea that
emotions, or at least our experience and understand-
ing of them, vary cross-culturally might seem to ar-
gue against Dutton’s argument that emotions—and
the arts he finds so closely related to them—are adap-
tive, in fact recognition of the variability of emotion
cross-culturally paves the way to recognition of the
powerful role arts have in shaping our understand-
ing, experience, and valuation of emotion within a
given culture. (Dutton, of course, is not arguing for
cultures all being the same.)
There are a number of mistakes, some based on
overgeneralization of Euro-American to all experi-
ence. Chess is not the onlymodel for “how the human
mind engages the strategic teleology of life” (p. 112);
the Japanese board game Go, while equally compet-
itive, individual-based, and strategic, works out in
fundamentally different ways, given that there is not
a “single check-mating purpose.”The ability “[t]o un-
derstand, intellectually and emotionally, the mind of
another” may “emerge spontaneously in [most] chil-
dren around the age of two,” but it is emphatically not
“fully developed by the age of five” (p. 119); formany
adults the cultivation and expansion of one’s ca-
pacities for compassion and understanding, whether
deliberate or enforced by raising a teenager, are
lifelong projects, possibly close to infinite in their
capacities. The notion that fictions “can also be un-
derstood as pleasurable fantasies” may trace back to
Freud (p. 121), but it is also found in medieval Japan.
It is simply untrue that “there is no living artistic tra-
dition where . . . [the] art is produced with no regard
for the individuals who do it” (p. 233); the decorative
and performing arts especially are full of glorious
and expensive productions in which the artists were
forced to live in circumstances of utter penury and
degradation. The anonymous and brilliant Buddhist
caves atDunhuang as well asAtlantic Records’ treat-
ment of famous African American musicians both
come to mind. Yet these are overexaggerations, and
not seriously troublesome—although getting some
of them right would lead the investigator down
more interesting paths regarding the arts and human
nature.
Much of the information and even the various par-
tial subtheories have been around a long time. And
some of them were originally his, published in The
Forger’s Art: Forgery and the Philosophy of Art (Uni-
versity of California Press, 1983) and “Tribal Art and
Artifact” (JAAC 51 [1993]). It is their collection and
integration within the theoretical context of the the-
ory of evolution that is new. Overall, this is one of
the most exciting and far-reaching philosophy books
to reach the public in some time. As either an enjoy-
able reading experience or an instigator of further
philosophical investigation (by Dutton and others),
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Searching for a philosophically illuminating set of
necessary and sufficient identity conditions can feel
like searching for an affordable apartment in Man-
hattan. It’s easy to despair. One of the many plea-
sures of John Kulvicki’s On Images: Their Structure
and Content is that it offers hope in this regard (for
philosophy, at least). Kulvicki proposes a set of four
individually necessary and jointly sufficient condi-
tions for something being a picture. A striking as-
pect of Kulvicki’s proposal is that it does not depend
upon howwe relate to pictures or how pictures relate
to the world, but on how pictorial representational
systems relate to other sorts of representational sys-
tems (such as languages). In this respect, as well as
many others, Kulvicki’s proposal is pervasively in-
debted to Nelson Goodman’s work in Languages of
Art (Hackett, 1976). ButKulvicki’s proposed account
is not just a restatement of Goodman’s views. With
regard to the three identity conditions that he inher-
its fromGoodman, Kulvicki offers decisive criticisms
of Goodman’s own formulations before substituting
more defensible formulations of his own. Kulvicki’s
fourth condition, as well as his account of pictorial
realism, finds no precedent in Goodman’s work.
Kulvicki’s four conditions are relative repleteness,
syntactic sensitivity, semantic richness, and trans-
parency. Perhaps the best way to illustrate the plau-
sibility of these conditions is by spelling out how they
are largely intended to articulate the fundamental
differences between pictures and sentences.
Pictures are more replete than sentences insofar
as more of their properties matter for their syntactic
identity than for those of sentences. In color pictures,
for instance, differences in coloration can matter,
whereas differences in the coloration of written sen-
tences are irrelevant. Even in black-and-white pic-
tures, the shading, the thickness of the lines, or (min-
imally) the relative sizes and contours of the outline
shapes can all matter, whereas all of these are irrele-
vant in the case of sentences.
Pictures are more syntactically sensitive than sen-
tences insofar as their syntactic identities are much
less tolerant of changes than are those of sentences.
In written English, for instance, aC remains aC until
one comes fairly close to closing the curved line of the
C shape altogether, at which point it becomes an O.
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But in a picture, all of the intermediate shapes that
one may make between C and O can matter for its
syntactic identity.
Semantic richness does not mark a distinction be-
tweenpictures and sentences but, rather, a distinction
between pictures and icons. Icons of Saint Sebastian
can be understood as pictures, as depicting a wide va-
riety of the ways in which people can be shot through
with arrows. But as icons they all denote one and the
same man, Saint Sebastian, just in virtue of the con-
vention of depicting him as shot through with arrows.
As pictures, however, they have as many possible de-
notations as they have syntactic types, and in this
sense pictorial representational systems are more se-
mantically rich than iconic representational systems.
Pictures are transparent, unlike sentences or icons,
insofar as a picture of a picture is syntactically iden-
tical to it. A sentence (such as this one) that refers to
the first sentence in this paragraph is far from being
syntactically identical to it. But if we take a picture
of this journal, and then take a picture of this picture,
the second picture will be syntactically identical to
the first.
It is not hard to note that all four of these con-
ditions invoke the notion of syntactic identity. Ulti-
mately, I think the defensibility of Kulvicki’s account
rests upon the question of whether he can provide
an adequate account of what it is to nonsemantically
individuate pictures in terms of something we can
plausibly call a syntax. Kulvicki is quick to point out
that a pictorial syntax need not be compositional, but
he is less quick to spell out what, exactly, a noncom-
positional pictorial syntax involves. One might think
that the syntactic identity of a picture is just whatever
two-dimensional pattern of lines and colors makes it
up. The problem is that this notion of syntax will not
be able to do the work that Kulvicki’s four conditions
need it to do. Think of his account of transparency, for
instance. Imagine a picture of this journal, depicted
from a point of view 45◦ to the left of it. Now imagine
a picture of this picture, taken from a similar point
of view. This second picture will hardly contain the
same two-dimensional pattern of lines and colors as
the first. So the syntactic identity of a picture, con-
trary to what we might intuitively think, cannot be
the two-dimensional pattern of lines and colors that
makes it up.
As a solution to this problem, Kulvicki invokes
the notion of “bare bones content” (BBC), which
he inherits from John Haugeland’s work in Hav-
ing Thought (Harvard University Press, 1998). The
BBC of a picture in linear perspective is its projec-
tive geometric invariants: that is, the set of geometric
properties that are invariant under all of its possi-
ble projective transformations. More colloquially, it
is the set of geometric properties that are shared by
all of the possible scenes that this picture can depict.
The perennially popular duck–rabbit figure (invoked
in philosophical discussions of pictures as often as
Hitler is invoked in ethics classes) rather vividly il-
lustrates one such set of properties. BBC seems to
solve Kulvicki’s problem because if the picture of the
picture of this journal (described above) is in linear
perspective, then both of these pictures will have the
same projective invariants. There are several wor-
ries I have about this solution. First of all, it requires
that the pictures in question be in linear perspective,
and Kulvicki can hardly assume that all genuine pic-
tures must be in linear perspective. Kulvicki might
suppose that all pictures are in something Margaret
Hagens calls “natural perspective” (in herVarieties of
Realism [Cambridge University Press, 1986]). If this
is true, it might imply that it is possible for the no-
tion of projective invariants to extend to all pictures.
But this question, like the task of explaining projec-
tive invariants themselves, is strangely neglected by
Kulvicki. He seems much more interested in draw-
ing out the implications of invoking the notion of
projective invariants than spelling out what exactly
is being invoked and why its invocation is defensi-
ble. It is not a very thorough explanation of this no-
tion to say that “[p]oints are mapped to points, lines
to lines, conic sections to conic sections, and so on”
(p. 56) in using projective geometry to arrive at in-
variants in projective transformations. Of course, one
can learn about projective invariants by reading a ge-
ometry textbook, such as the one that Kulvicki cites.
But given the central role that this notion plays in
his account, as well as the many questions one might
have about whether it can do the work he assigns
to it, a more thorough explanation of it by Kulvicki
himself would have been preferable. A second worry
that I have about invoking projective invariants to
account for the syntactic identity of pictures is that
color is not a geometric property, so projective invari-
ants by themselves cannot suffice to account for the
syntactic identity of color pictures. If one takes a pic-
ture in dimly lit conditions of a picture that is taken
in dimly lit conditions, the surface colors of these two
pictures will not be identical. It might be that the no-
tion of geometric projective invariants can serve as
a model for some sort of nongeometric color-related
properties that are shared by these two pictures, but
Kulvicki does not even begin to explore this issue. In
short, for Kulvicki’s proposal to succeed, what works
for shapes (in linear perspective) will have to work
for colors (and shapes in nonlinear perspective), but
it is far from obvious that this is the case. A third and
perhaps most important worry is that it is hard to see
how individuating pictures in terms of their BBC is
nonsemantically individuating them. After all, it is
bare bones content.
Kulvicki’s response to this third worry would pre-
sumably be to remind us that a significant feature of
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his account is that pictures in linear perspective are
instances of their own BBC. That is, the picture of a
picture of this journal itself embodies the projective
invariants that it depicts. If pictures were identical to
their own BBC, this would allow Kulvicki to avoid
the third worry, albeit at the cost of conflating a dis-
tinction that Kulvicki himself invokes in criticism of
others: between the syntax and semantics of pictures.
But pictures are not identical to their own BBC; they
are fleshed-out instances of their own BBC, where
the fleshed-out content of a picture is precisely what
we see in it (such as the duck or the rabbit), as op-
posed to its BBC (which we have to abstract from
pictures in order to “see” at all). The problem, simply
put, is that this means that there is no nonsemantic
way to identify a syntax of pictures in terms of BBC.
At this point, one wonders what really motivates
Kulvicki’s insistence that we can identify a theoret-
ically useful notion of pictorial syntax. Goodman
thought that we could, but he also thought that there
is only a difference in degree (of repleteness, sensi-
tivity, and richness) between pictures and sentences,
and that it is possible to neatly separate out the syn-
tactic and semantic identities of sentences. Kulvicki’s
invocation of transparency seems to show that he is
interested in identifying a difference in kind between
pictures and sentences. But doing this might well re-
quire abandoning Goodman’s commitment to think-
ing that pictures have neatly separable syntactic and
semantic identities. In short, I worry that Kulvicki’s
criticisms of Goodman do not cut deep enough. A
proper formulation of the truths in Kulvicki’s ac-
count may well require a more thorough rejection
of the commitments underlying Goodman’s purely
structural approach.
Kulvicki’s book ends with his account of pictorial
realism. It is a fitting way to end such a provoca-
tive book and more than amply illustrates his ca-
pacity for genuinely original philosophical thought.
There are two parts to Kulvicki’s account of real-
ism: an intra-systemic aspect and an inter-systemic
aspect. The first is intended to elucidate what we
mean when we call one picture more realistic than
another within a pictorial representational system.
The second is intended to elucidate what we mean
when we call a particular pictorial representational
system as a whole more realistic than other pictorial
representational systems.
Kulvicki calls his notion of intra-systemic realism
“verity.” It ismeant to capture theway inwhich picto-
rial realism involves both verisimilitude and accuracy.
His account of verity begins with a striking claim: it is
amistake to thinkof the different artistic styles exhib-
ited by pictures in an average art museum as inhabit-
ing different representational systems. On Kulvicki’s
account, David’s Death of Socrates is more realis-
tic than Giotto’s frescoes or Picasso’s Old Guitarist
precisely because they are in the same representa-
tional system (presumably, something like linear per-
spective). For Kulvicki, these pictures differ with re-
gard to whether or not the properties that they depict
their subjects as having accord with our conceptions
of such things. For example, the hands of David’s
Socrates are realistic because they are depicted in
accordance with how we ordinarily conceive hands
to be, whereas the hands of Giotto’s subjects are de-
picted as being longer and skinnier thanweordinarily
conceive hands to be, and the hands of Picasso’s gui-
tarist are depicted as being longer, skinnier, and col-
ored differently than we ordinarily conceive hands to
be. Onemight think that linear perspective has taken
on imperialist ambitions at this point, threatening to
force us to understand rather distinct artistic styles
by its own parochial legislation, but there is an un-
expected payoff to treating all three of these artistic
styles as inhabiting the same representational sys-
tem: it gives Kulvicki a way of explaining “revelatory
realism,” the way in which pictures that were once
taken to be paradigms of realism can later strike us
as unrealistic. For instance, when Giotto’s frescoes
were first viewed they were widely praised for their
realism, but they rarely receive such praise today.
Kulvicki proposes that what originally madeGiotto’s
frescoes realistic was the novel fact that more of
their surface features were relevant for their seman-
tic interpretation than had been true for previous
pictures. In Giotto’s frescoes, shading and coloration
were utilized more extensively than in previous pic-
tures, to represent a wider range of the properties
of the shapes and light sources depicted. Once we
become familiar with the way in which these surface
features can be used to represent these properties,
however, we tend to approach other pictures with
the expectation that their shading and coloration will
be similarly significant.However, if we have these ex-
pectations and approach pictures that were created
before Giotto discovered the pictorial significance of
such surface features, we will be inclined to interpret
them as representing their subjects as having proper-
ties that probably do not accord with our conceptions
of such things. We will, in other words, see them as
unrealistic depictions.
Kulvicki’s account of verity is unabashedly ob-
server dependent. What separates it from the bulk of
other observer-dependent accounts of pictorial real-
ism, however, is that he does not just invoke some
fairly underspecified variable (such as habit or nov-
elty) to account for the difference between observers
who find Giotto’s frescoes realistic and those who do
not. The variables he invokes (that is, conceptions
of the objects depicted and familiarity with the pos-
sible pictorial significance of the surface features of
the pictures themselves) are much more substantive.
For this reason alone, his account of pictorial realism
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deserves serious consideration and should make it
onto the radar of anyone who is inclined to defend
an observer-independent notion of realism, accord-
ing to which realism involves a relation between ei-
ther the surface features or the content of a picture
and the world itself.
In addition to verity (that is, Kulvicki’s intra-
systemic aspect of realism) he also introduces two
inter-systemic aspects of realism: informativeness
and mimicry. A particular pictorial representational
system is more informative than another if it is more
replete, more syntactically sensitive, and more se-
mantically rich than other pictorial representational
systems. A particular pictorial representational sys-
tem is more mimetic than another insofar as perceiv-
ing it is more like perceiving what it depicts in both
the information it provides and how it provides this
information.
Kulvicki’s account of pictures is nothing if not
counterintuitive. It defines pictures andpictorial real-
ism without mentioning how pictures look. It implies
that pictures are not essentially visual. It even implies
that everything is a realistic picture of itself. Rather
than worry about intuitiveness of his account, how-
ever, Kulvicki proceeds by rigorously investigating
all of the dominant philosophical views in the litera-
ture on pictorial representation. In the breadth and
depth of his coverage of this literature, his discussion
is unparalleled. The account that results from this in-
vestigation is an unprecedented synthesis of the mer-
its of these otherwise divergent views. For this reason
alone, any subsequent work on pictorial representa-
tion will have to take his account into consideration.
It may not be the last word on pictorial represen-
tation, but it will certainly remain a centerpiece of
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kraut, robert. Artworld Metaphysics. Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2007, 187 pp., $75.00 cloth.
The seven short essays comprising Artworld Meta-
physics give the impression of sharing no single topic
and advancing no single thesis. Instead, one finds
self-standing discussions of selected, sometimes cen-
tral questions in aesthetics. Does music express emo-
tion? How can there be more than one correct inter-
pretation of an artwork? How is ontology relevant to
aesthetics? Is jazz somehow philosophically special?
Are traditional philosophical approaches to aesthet-
ics only just so much intellectual colonialism? The
discussions are smart and sharp, often doing much to
clear the ground around these issues.
Or perhaps these essays share more than they
seem to. Certain themes recur in the essays. Method-
ological questions continually crowd to the fore. Ex-
planation, in particular, plays a central role time and
again. But what the essays share most conspicuously
is their style and sensibility. Partly this is a matter of
the, say, Krautliness of the prose. Its pace is brisk,
but it remains lucid at speed. Thoughts come to-
gether, flower, and go to seed in the space of a few
short paragraphs. The philosophical ambit brought
to bear on each question is wide. A steady diet of
examples from the philosophy of language, mathe-
matics, and ethics is always close to hand. More im-
portantly, none of the essays much conforms to the
thesis–argument–objections template of contempo-
rary professional philosophy. Instead, eachmeanders
through the space of a given problem, trying to figure
out the philosophical lay of the land. In which philo-
sophical terms can we formulate this issue? What
would count as a solution in those terms?What kinds
of solutions and arguments does this way of formu-
lating the problemmake possible?What canwe learn
from similarly structured problems elsewhere in phi-
losophy? This is not to say that Robert Kraut takes
no stands or offers no arguments; both are in ready
supply. It is that the essays are allowed to unfold like
conversations in which particular resolutions, even
Kraut’s own, are subordinate to wider issues of un-
derstanding the space of the question itself. This pri-
ority in the essays, alongwith their pace and structure,
embeds a message: there is no shame in simply be-
ing wrong; it is being confused that is intellectually
shameful.
If this has started to sound less like style and
more like pointed advice about how to do your job,
then we have arrived at what I suspect is Artworld
Metaphysics’ genuine, if unacknowledged, topic: the
metaphilosophical question of how one ought to go
about doing philosophy. Each essay is as much an
object lesson in philosophical practice as it is an in-
vestigation of some topic within it. Every stylistic
characterization above might be reformulated as a
methodological thesis, or at least an aphorism. Now
it is true that any sincere work cannot help but en-
dorse its own methodology simply by employing it,
and that methodology is not thereby the subject of
every work. But there is ample reason to think it
weighs heavily with Kraut, for often the topic be-
comes explicit.
The opening essay argues for the methodological
importance and propriety of a distinction between
engaging in a practice and reflecting on it, here,
between participating in the artworld (whether by
producing, appreciating, criticizing, even theorizing
about art) and philosophizing about it. While some
principled worries are confronted (Does this require
an unavailable external perspective on the artworld?
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Can reflective artistic practice become indistinguish-
able from philosophical reflection? Would the de-
scriptive nature of the envisioned enterprise rob it
of its relevance? No, no, and no) Kraut’s true oppo-
nent here, and throughout the book, is that linger-
ing and stubborn skepticism that haunts the pages
and conference rooms of professional philosophical
aesthetics: the suspicion that doing genuine, authen-
tic aesthetics is somehow incompatible with genuine,
rigorous philosophy. This is an attitude equally man-
ifested in complaints about soft-minded, philosophy-
free wallowing about in the artiness of it all as in
charges of losing the distinctive character and sub-
ject matter of aesthetics by assimilating its charming
peculiarities to colorless global debates. By Kraut’s
lights, this dilemma is false. Philosophy has a distinc-
tive task, and what follows is both model and demon-
stration of the possibility of philosophical aesthetics
that is genuine twice over.
A linchpin of his reconciliation project turns out to
be aproper appreciation for the role of explanation in
philosophical problems. On the one hand, taking the
distinctive reflective turn as explanatory weds one to
the phenomena of the artworld, whatever they may
be. Its denizens do, say, feel, and think a ridiculous
welter. Understood as phenomena to be explained,
not one bit of this can be shrugged off. Phenomena
simply are, andwhat fails to explain them simply fails.
It is here that Kraut wants to secure what is particular
about art and our experiences of and around it. And
so to cases. To many musicians, Kraut included, the
demands of performance are strikingly like those of
speaking a language; that this is sowants explanation.
Tomany, though not toKraut,music seems to express
emotion; again, the fact awaits explanation. Properly
practiced metaphysics of art is in no danger of losing
its subject; it is up to its neck in it.
On the other hand, where reflection is taken to
be explanation, an inevitable distance opens between
the explanatory activity and its subject. The datamay
be inviolable, but they are alsomute. There is no obli-
gation that the terms in which the phenomena un-
fold, express, or understand themselves be the terms
in which their explanation proceeds. Defending the
legitimacy of so-called inverted explanations is the
main business of the second chapter. Hume and his
ilk may be mistaken in claiming that our attributions
of “cause” or “immorality” can be fully explained
in causally or morally neutral terms, but they are
not confused. Confusion rests primarily with those
who have misunderstood the character of this sort of
project, who have mistaken explanation for analysis.
Likewise, insofar as an “institutional” account of art
like Arthur Danto’s or George Dickie’s attempts an
explanation of our uses of the term ‘art’ that itself
has no use for the concept, the account is perfectly
in order and immune to a variety of misconceived
objections. The door is open, then, to an account of
our finding emotion in music, or our finding perfor-
mance to be like speaking, that “accommodates” all
the phenomena as phenomena, but has no use for
music’s really expressing emotion or performance’s
actually being much like a language. As Kraut says,
“There’s more than one way to respect the data.”
In this emphasis on explanation over analysis, the
essays are very much of our time. Their success lies
partly in the way the explanatory attitude seems
homegrown from aesthetic concerns and not simply
grafted onto them. Indeed, the essays quite naturally
take us to hard questions that go along with this atti-
tude. Where exactly do questions about the justifica-
tion of our practices and their normative aspects end
up standing? Once we take this explanatory stance
toward our practices, what use have we really left for
“correctness” within them as opposed to conflicting
commitments?What exactly do we want to say about
the “reality” of what receives inverted explanation?
That it is illusion? Or that we have discovered its,
quite real, nature? Like a good host, Kraut takes us
in far enough to feel these concerns for ourselves,
acknowledges their difficulty, and excuses himself.
Aestheticians, welcome to the party.
The introductions are notwithout their false notes.
Kraut suspects that attributing emotional content to
musical compositions offers no explanatory advan-
tage over not doing so. Once we have subtracted
the causal-emotional contribution of the performers
and the composer, what is left to explain in our ex-
perience of works by attributing further emotional
content to them? But while we often think of music’s
expressiveness on Tolstoy’s model of communicating
what the artist feels, we need not exclude the possi-
bility of artists who craft their works to express emo-
tions they themselves do not feel. If all composition is
performance—itself a claim embraced with too little
ado—then we need to keep in mind that not all acting
is Method acting. But having done so, we seem to
have unacknowledged phenomena, the explanation
of whichmight require attributing emotional content
to works themselves after all.
Two larger, later chapters revolve around interpre-
tations. Chapter 5 connects ontological questions—
What are the boundaries of a work? What are its
properties?—with interpretive ones. The notion of
proper appreciation provides the connection be-
tween how the work really is and the best interpre-
tation of it. Given one, we can read off the other,
but picking a starting point proves difficult. Kraut
thinks “best interpretation” looks more tractable if
we think about it, again, through the lens of “best ex-
planation.” Chapter 6 broaches the question of “Crit-
ical Pluralism,” the possibility of incompatible but
equally correct interpretations (ontology too, given
the equation of chapter 5). What becomes less and
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less clear, however, iswhatKraut takes interpretation
to be andwhether he is still talking about any familiar
activity. The term seems increasingly cut loose from
the few examples that introduced it and is eventually
asked to bear weight for which we have little feel.
We are to prefer an interpretation with the power
to explain not just features of the work but also the
appearance of other, inferior interpretations. It is un-
clear how the often humble activity that can pass for
interpretation of an artwork, as opposed to, say, a
scientific theory, is the kind of thing that can explain
the existence and illusoriness of alternative explana-
tions. Later, an interpretation is supposed the kind
of thing that may be fixed by fixing a community
of interpretative interests. But I would have thought
that interpretations were the sort of thing that pro-
duced conflict even among those whose interests and
backgrounds are closely aligned. Maybe it is just my
friends, but thinking the only source of conflict is the
disparateness of communities seems another hope-
less idealization.
Last, it is worth noting a certain rhetorical tension
between the metaphilosophical tendencies of the es-
says and their mere philosophical tendencies. For a
book that recommends the explanationist standpoint
so trenchantly, remarkably little explaining actually
goes on, as opposed to, say, analysis. Indeed, it is re-
ally the idea of explanation, and not the activity itself,
that has the starring role in making the world safe
for explanation. Given this, it is not surprising that
the essays get by without any serious investigation
of what makes for explanation, or good explanation.
What is surprising is the way this lack undermines the
methodological role modeling that is the philosophi-
cal heart of the book. It seems thatwhat aestheticians,
and philosophers more generally, ought to be doing




parsons, glenn and allen carlson. Func-
tional Beauty. OxfordUniversity Press, 2008, xiii+
255 pp., $70.00 cloth.
This ambitious and important book sets out to re-
store the place of function in aesthetics. In an intro-
ductory historical survey, the authors point out that
although “fitness” for function was a central theme
in eighteenth-century aesthetics, “disinterestedness”
eventually pushed it aside and, despite the recent turn
toward “cognitively rich” aesthetic theories, function
is still neglected. A major reason for this neglect is
the existence of two seemingly intractable problems
that surface in discussions of architecture and de-
sign: the “Problem of Indeterminacy” (How can we
identify the “proper” function of a building or an ar-
tifact?) and the “Problem of Translation” (How can
our perceptual response to a building or an artifact
be affected by a knowledge of its function?).
Theauthors’ answer to the indeterminacyquestion
is their most original contribution. Rejecting existing
intentionalist solutions, they derive their definition
of proper function from evolutionary biology and
philosophy of science. Among biologically informed
concepts of function, they reject “causal role” ex-
planations (the role something plays within a living
system) in favor of “selected effects” theories (the
existence of a trait due to natural selection). Then
they draw an analogy between the natural history of
reproduction and the reproduction of artifacts to ar-
rive at their definition of proper function: “X has a
proper function F if and only if Xs currently exist be-
cause, in the recent past, ancestors of Xwere success-
ful in meeting some need or want in the marketplace
because they performed F, leading to the manufac-
ture and distribution of Xs” (p. 75). Although they
admit that there is still some vagueness to their defi-
nition (Howmany artifacts need to be manufactured
and for how long?), their “key point” is that this
definition rescues proper function from “the messy
realm of human intentions” (p. 77). At the same time
they believe their approach also establishes the “core
idea” that proper function belongs “to the object it-
self” rather than being “imposed” on it by use or
context (p. 83).
The authors’ solution to the problem of transla-
tion draws on Kendall Walton’s “categories of art”
(standard, variable, contra-standard) to argue that
differences in the knowledge of how objects func-
tion lead us to see them in a different way and
to perceive different aesthetic qualities in them. In
the case of the traditional idea of an object’s “look-
ing fit” for its function, there must be no contra-
standard features and many variable ones that ref-
erence its proper function, for example, the formal
features of a “muscle car” that make them an aes-
thetically pleasing translation of function but would
be displeasing in a hearse. The authors explain the
perception of aesthetic qualities like simplicity or
grace by the fact that the object shows only stan-
dard features associated with its function, such as
the streamlined look of modernism, perhaps the
“most familiar kind of Functional Beauty” (p. 98).
Finally, Walton’s contra-standard category is used to
explain that some items may be considered func-
tionally beautiful because they manifest a “pleas-
ing dissonance” between function and appearance.
As these examples make clear, Glenn Parsons and
Allen Carlson adopt a “cognitively rich” understand-
ing of aesthetic experience that allows them to in-
clude knowledge of function within aesthetic ex-
perience. The cognitive emphasis also helps them
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incorporate a crucial desideratum of any functional
theory: the aesthetic qualities of a functional object
must be experienced as “emerging from” or “arising
out of” its function rather than simply consistent with
it. In this way they can answer skeptics who claim that
“looking fit” for function is not really an aesthetic but
a utilitarian pleasure by showing that “we do possess
the capacity to take pleasure in the mere perception
of a thing’s looking fit” (p. 106).
In the second half of the book, the authors set
out to show that their particular theory of “Func-
tional Beauty” offers superior solutions to problems
in the aesthetics of nature, architecture, everyday ar-
tifacts, and art. In the case of nature, they believe
their version of functional beauty can answer the im-
morality objection to the aesthetic appreciation of
animals by making functional beauty “internal” and
therefore belonging to animals themselves (whether
perceived as functionally beautiful or as malfunc-
tioning), whereas other theories of function, such
as Kant’s dependent beauty idea, only allow for an
“external” relation between function and beauty. In
the case of architecture, they amend their “success
in the marketplace” definition to include “preserva-
tion” alongside “manufacture.” In the case of every-
day aesthetics, they argue for the superiority of their
functional beauty theory to Deweyan approaches
and vigorously reject any attempt to expand aesthetic
experience to include the proximal senses. In the case
of art, they reject both intentionalist theories of art’s
function (Monroe Beardsley, Gary Iseminger, Nick
Zangwill) and “causal role” theories (David Novitz,
Richard Lind, Richard Richards) as unable to show
that one function ismore important than another.Al-
though the authors admit that not even their selective
effects theory can tell us the proper function of art in
general, they argue it can do so for subcategories,
such as religious art or horror films, by showing
that their functional effect is “causally responsible”
for their continued “production and dissemination”
(p. 221).
Parsons and Carlson conclude that bringing func-
tion back into the heart of aesthetics on their terms
will give the field not only greater comprehensive-
ness, but also greater unity by using the same princi-
ple of selected effects for both nature and artifacts.
In their view, the only other approach that takes
function seriously—the Kantian model of adherent
beauty—lacks comprehensiveness and unity since it
treats function as merely an external constraint on
response to form. Although they grant that there
may be other aspects to beauty besides function,
they believe functional beauty “may occupy a cen-
tral and primary place in all our aesthetic experience”
(p. 234).
The book is an impressive achievement, and any-
onewhohaswrestledwith these issueswill havemuch
to learn from it. But there are also serious limitations.
Before looking at those, I have an initial reserva-
tion about the capitalized term ‘Functional Beauty.’
They say they chose ‘beauty’ over ‘aesthetics’ be-
cause the latter is so “unlovely,” even though their
“central concept is, really, aesthetic appreciation in-
volving knowledge that concerns function” (p. xii). I
found the capitalized term confusing on several oc-
casions since it sometimes refers to a particular kind
of beauty, sometimes to the general theme of func-
tion in aesthetics, and sometimes to one or another
theory of function, including their own.
As for the authors’ major theoretical contribution
of defining “proper function” by using marketplace
success as the equivalent of evolutionary success, I
found the force of the analogy between selected ef-
fects in biology and in themarketplace unclear. Since
the authors admit that even the selected effects–the
marketplace approach leaves proper function a bit
vague (the how much for how long problem), I won-
der if there may not be better ways of dealing with
intentionalist individualism than by absorbing the
entire “messy realm of human intentions” (p. 77)
into market forces. Moreover, the authors’ under-
lying concern here seems to be relativism—they close
their discussion of indeterminacy by saying they have
shown that “not all of themany functions of a particu-
lar artifact are equal” (p. 88). I agree that not all func-
tions are equal, but I doubt that our choice is either
complete relativism or selected effects–marketplace
theory. The latter seems too blunt an instrument for
adjudicating importance in the case of multifunc-
tional artifacts like major works of architecture, just
the cases most challenging and interesting for aes-
thetic judgment.
I have similar concerns about the authors’ solution
to the problem of translation—although their adap-
tation of Walton’s categories of art is helpful for un-
derstanding artifacts whose primary function is rel-
atively easy to determine. They correctly stress that
we need to know how an object performs its func-
tion since there are “many alternative designs” that
might “satisfy the basic function of an item” (p. 93).
But with more complex multifunctional objects like
buildings, it is not easy to determine which possible
forms are “standard” with respect to any particu-
lar function. Given the astonishingly diverse techni-
cal and formal innovations in architecture over the
past sixty years, it is no longer clear what the “stan-
dard” form of an apartment building, an office, a
bank, or a library is, let alone the “standard” form of
an art museum, a concert hall, or a civic center. My
point is not that relativism is inescapable, but that
multifunctional architecture may require a suppler
analysis than the authors’ theory of “proper” and
“standard” provides. Moreover, the book does not
discuss the fact that many works of architecture (and
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design) are considered works of art, something that
adds yet another layer of complexity.
I found the discussion of everyday aesthetics the
least satisfactory application of their theory, mostly
because it is focused on a rather skewed critique
of “the Deweyan approach” of Carolyn Korsmeyer,
Tom Leddy, Yuriko Saito, and others, all of whom
are charged with subordinating function to sensuous
pleasure. Moreover, I can see no intrinsic connection
between the authors’ specific theory of functional
beauty and their insistence on restricting aesthetic
experience to the distal senses. Here again, their un-
derlying concern seems to be relativism, which in
this case they fear would result from allowing the
proximal senses into aesthetics. This worry seems in
turn to derive from a contestable assumption that
touch, taste, and smell have no cognitive dimension
and would therefore leave little place for evaluative
discussions concerning the aesthetic translation of
function (p. 193).
An aesthetic theory as wide-ranging as Parsons
and Carlson’s is bound to do some things better
than others. It seems to work best with nature and
with single-function artifacts and less well withmulti-
functional artifacts and architectural works, espe-
cially those that claim the status of art. Like many
theories, theirs is stronger in what it affirms than
what it denies. Not only may we expect counterar-
guments from intentionalists and “Deweyans,” but
there are also recent reinterpretations of Kant’s de-
pendent beauty concept that provide an “internal”
understanding of function in aesthetic judgment that
could be the basis of an alternative theory. Yet none
of the reservations I have expressed diminishes the
major achievement of Functional Beauty, which is to
have reclaimed a central place for function in aesthet-
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In Science of Logic, G. W. F. Hegel adopts Friedrich
Schelling’s metaphor of “petrified intelligence” to
characterize nature, in its self-enclosed and indiffer-
ent totality, as a persistent invitation to thought. In
its seamless interconnectedness and striving toward
comprehensiveness (in short, in its horror vacui),
nature offers us a cipher of intelligence, the key
to which we never stop seeking. But Hegel’s ap-
propriation of Schelling’s metaphor is as much a
warning as an incitement, for to forget that nature
is but a petrification—an image—of thinking, and
not thinking proper, is to fall (back) into animism.
Indeed: according to Hegel, our apprehension of
nature as petrified is how we experience the re-
nunciation of animism; it embodies the first self-
conscious distinction between the mere image of
thinking and the real thing. The denial that nature
is self-understanding (hence the perception that na-
ture still demands to be understood) provides us our
initial incentive to think for ourselves.
In the Hegelian perspective, art shares with na-
ture this quality of displaced intelligence. In both,
thinking shows up “out there,” in a world that is dis-
closed to the minds that seek to make sense of it only
through their sensuous engagement with it. There is,
to be sure, the key difference that, in art, thinking
has begun to rouse itself from its petrified natural
state. But because thought in art remains tied to sen-
suous forms and hence is limited in the level of self-
understanding it can attain, it forever remains, for
Hegel, the lowest form of thinking. His insight into
the sensuous unyieldingness of art sets Hegel on the
road toward his hierarchy of forms of thought, from
art to religion to philosophy, each more capable of
explicitness than the one that precedes it, hence each
better equipped to discharge thought’s striving for
an understanding of its own nature. Because art is
the first station on the path of thinking, the question
whether artifice or nature is the right concept with
which to begin to grasp it is never done being posed.
As Daniel Herwitz puts it, “The truth in art starts in
the human gut and works upwards toward the brain”
(p. 163). It is in the natural feeling of the gut, Her-
witz says, that the work of art begins, but in the gut
qualified as human; it then worms its way not into
the mind but, as if on a physiological trellis, upward
to the brain. An odd formula to my ears—a brainiac’s
image of gutsiness, perhaps?—but through it Herwitz
expresses clearly how art’s mixed nature remains a
problem for all the more abstracted forms of think-
ing that would, in thinking about it, seek to strip it
completely of its affinity with the force of nature.
That art remains a force beyond simple under-
standing is a driving thought in Herwitz’s introduc-
tion to aesthetics. He returns throughout to detailed
discussions of works of art not so much to illustrate
this or that philosophical thesis as to motivate, over
and again, the demand to philosophize. Yet this raises
the question: how does art press this demand? For it
would be wrong to take art’s problematic status, as
Hegel took nature’s petrification, as a reason to treat
art merely as a stimulus to thought, which would in
turn deny art’s kinship with the more abstract forms
of reflection that take up its challenges. Even if not
necessarily in propositional form, art goes beyond
embodying concepts and, in its own fashion, knows
344 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
them. In this sense, art is, along with religion and phi-
losophy, postlapsarian. Our experience of art may
lead us (it did Plato) to regard it as arising outside
of thought proper, for works of art create many of
theirwondrous effects beforewebegin to think about
them. According to Herwitz, “[Works of art] occa-
sion truth by setting up the materials and forms of
their medium in a way that places us in the posi-
tion of finding ourselves wondering about something
that has happened to us” (p. 161). But regardless of
how tempted we are to adopt a regressive conception
of art as inherently petrified (more commonly these
days as petrified history, as Herwitz’s characteriza-
tion of art as inflicting experience on us suggests),
it is a mistake nonetheless. Developing a credible
critique of the narrow treatment of works of art as
documents is obviously not a proper aim for a book
review. But as a way of getting at what is provocative
and problematic aboutHerwitz’s introduction to aes-
thetics, it is helpful to stress that if art is, in Hegelian
terms, the first form of unpetrified thinking, it must
be conceived not as a mere incentive to thinking, but
rather as an introduction to it.
Fully half of Herwitz’s history of aesthetics is de-
voted to understanding art as a form of thinking,
so this Hegelian contextualization of his approach is
no alien imposition. Still, I confess that I emphasize
Hegel here only tomakeone specific point: while phi-
losophy as such might, as Hegel proposed, or might
not be in direct competition with the cognitive and
affective significance of art, introductions to the phi-
losophy of art undoubtedly are. In the last decade,
there has been a flood of introductions to aesthetics
(as well as readers, handbooks, casebooks, encyclo-
pedias, and so on). It is sometimes hard to figure out
forwhom these books are intended, but if even a frac-
tion of them is being widely read, we must be living
in the golden age of aesthetic education. Or not: the
need for one introduction after another could just as
well mean that none of these texts is accomplishing
the task of providing those with “interest in, but little
prior knowledge of, philosophy,” as the blurb on the
back ofHerwitz’s book condescendingly describes its
target audience, the little prior knowledge they need
in order to get on to the thing itself. (These words,
of course, are the market blather of the publisher
and not Herwitz’s own.) Perhaps we should consider
the possibility that these texts, instead of serving to
introduce philosophical aesthetics, are getting in the
way of the power of art to introduce a kind of think-
ing that cannot be grasped at the primer level. What
makes Herwitz’s book such a splendid roller coaster
of a read is that he both (1) takes to heart the chal-
lenge of thinking of art as the best introduction to
aesthetics and (2) ignores it altogether.
(1) Taking the challenge to heart: Herwitz pro-
vides penetrating summaries of the views of several
of the key figures in the history of aesthetics. David
Hume, Immanuel Kant, Hegel, R. G. Collingwood,
John Dewey, Arthur C. Danto, Richard Wollheim,
Stanley Cavell, KendallWalton, and JacquesDerrida
are discussed in ways a teacher of aesthetics will feel
comfortable commending to students. (I omit tomen-
tion Plato and Aristotle only because Herwitz’s brief
summaries of them are openly preliminary to the
main event, which is modern aesthetics.) This is not
to say that Herwitz neglects to treat his key figures as
philosophers, that is, to argue with them. Indeed, his
most moving writing is devoted to showing how the
really interesting limits to philosophical positions are
thrown up not by competitor philosophical positions
but byworks of art. Herwitz’s overall dialectical story
is shaped, in other words, by the concrete demands
of specific works of art that the particular aesthetic
theory under discussion cannot meet. “We have so
many positions in aesthetics,” Herwitz claims, not be-
cause we have so many interesting aestheticians but
“because the subject demands them: art and the ex-
periences, conversations and institutions in which it
variously happens and remains” (p. 172). In this light,
Herwitz keeps returning to works of art because they
are the proper introduction to philosophical thought.
(2) Ignoring the challenge altogether: Still in the
vein of responding to art as the power to introduce
thinking, Herwitz writes, “The best of philosophical
aesthetics has almost always aimed at producing a di-
alogue between art, the broad intellectual currents of
the time and the history and practice of philosophy”
(p. 3). Yet because Herwitz’s book is an introduc-
tory aesthetics text, the generic demands of which
include compactness and alacrity, the middle term of
that formulation—”the broad intellectual currents of
the time”—largely drops out, and so the idea of art
as the introduction of thinking is replaced in prac-
tice by the idea of art as an incentive to philosophize.
Fine, youmight say: everyone is entitled to choose his
or her own focus, and to make Hume, Kant, Danto,
and so on intelligible inevitably requires a decisive
narrowing of the field. Now, for a philosopher less
committed than Herwitz to the expansive concep-
tion of aesthetics as driven by art’s power, I suppose
this would be a palatable defense. But it is clearly
Herwitz’s view that the power of art is measured by
the forces it unleashes in society at large. His cap-
tivating discussion of South African art in the early
1990s ends with the Hegelian claim that “because art
is an expression of the aspirations of place and time,
art has a history and that history is essential for its un-
derstanding and appreciation” (p. 86). To the extent,
therefore, that the broad currents of history disap-
pear from the philosophical analysis and Herwitz’s
introduction becomes absorbed entirely by works of
art and the philosophies they limit, his book either
ceases to be an instance of “the best of philosophical
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aesthetics” or it performatively contradicts its thesis.
Either way, that is a problem in an introduction to
the field!
Let me be very clear here: I am saying that Her-
witz’s book is among the very best of the recent tidal
wave of introductory aesthetics texts because it so
lustily embraces the contradiction between the view
that art introduces “thinking” into social and polit-
ical life at-large and the narrowing of “thinking” to
abstract philosophical aesthetics. In his introductory
chapter, Herwitz argues that modern aesthetics is
constituted by a “self-proclaimed divorce between
philosophical methods and those of the humanities
generally” that “put aesthetics, ironically, in a cor-
ner” (p. 7). Acknowledging that aesthetics has re-
fined its philosophical methods by sitting alone in its
corner, Herwitz’s stated aim is to get it back into the
mix. Thus, as he gets ready to wrap up, Herwitz ar-
gues that the aim of art is to produce dialogue. “The
point of truth occasioned by art is to migrate into the
public sphere. Billy Wilder said the mark of a good
film is when people can’t wait to go have coffee and
cake and start talking about it.” In the perspective of
Wilder’s (echtViennese!) formulation, art itself is the
best introduction to thinking because it “put[s] life on
its head so we may and must think it over” (p. 168).
This is muddy, for if aesthetics stays in the corner,
then hasn’t it turned down art’s introduction to talk?
Divorce and dialogue: I doubt that Herwitz can have
it both ways. In a Hegelian vein, the introduction to
thinking may well be art, but if, as Herwitz argues
vigorously, philosophical aesthetics is the field that
got going by kicking its original partner—Ciceronian
humanitas—out of the house, then an introduction to
it requires a whole other history.
Now, to be fair, there is ready to hand a historical
resolution to this apparent quarrel between aesthet-
ics, humanities, and art: if the power of art to in-
troduce thinking consistently gets blocked by some
stronger force, it may need the assistance of aesthet-
ics in pressing its introduction on us. Philosophical
aesthetics in this sense would not be a higher form of
thought but, instead, an instrument for returning us
to art’s blocked introduction of new thinking. Hegel
certainly thought something like this since, if art, as
he emphatically put it, remains a thing of the past, its
power to introduce thought stays available to those
forms of reflection (historically informed philosophy,
for one?) that can find their way back to it. And there
is no doubt that Herwitz, too, thinks something like
this. Billy Wilder’s dream of art often fails, he says,
because of the overwhelming noise that distorts pub-
lic deliberation over coffee and cake (p. 168).Against
this sort of impediment to thinking, to the social and
political dialogue that, according to Herwitz, art in-
troduces, philosophical aesthetics may have a crucial
critical role to play. But then the real introduction
to aesthetics comes not from grasping the power of
art but from confronting what is in its way. And that
requires not another introduction to aesthetics as a
self-contained field but, instead, a critical theory of
society and art’s place in it. In the 1998 Encyclopedia
of Aesthetics edited by Michael Kelly (Oxford Uni-
versity Press), with which Herwitz says his own book
is allied, the materials for such a critical theory were
laid before us. And while Herwitz’s is surely the best
we deserve in the way of taking those materials up in
an introductory way, its goodness is inextricable from
its perpetuation of the refusal of art’s introduction of
thinking. If we are able to see that, then perhaps, and
paradoxically, Herwitz will have written the real in-
troduction to aesthetics by writing the final one. The




eldridge, richard. Literature, Life, and Modernity.
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Richard Eldridge’s new book promises and delivers
insight into three daunting subjects: literature, life,
and modernity. His starting point seems to be litera-
ture, or, more exactly, his deeply held conviction that
close reading of literary works enriches our lives. The
stresses and complexities of modernity reinforce our
need for literature and shape the benefits it offers
us. Although Eldridge focuses on literary works that
engage the specific conditions of modern experience,
he also reflects on our lives as finite individuals sub-
ject to time, loss, and incompleteness, thus always
and everywhere in need of what he thinks literature
provides.
To bring home the value of literature, Eldridge
sketches the modern world with which it must con-
tend. It is a bleak picture, reminiscent of the “savage
torpor” that WilliamWordsworth found gripping his
contemporaries or the “lives of quiet desperation”
to which Henry David Thoreau thought his neigh-
bors had succumbed. Aimless getting and spend-
ing, endless conflict and competition among discon-
nected, self-interested individuals, stultifying work,
and escapist entertainment rule the day. Boredom,
depression, and dissatisfaction unsettle everyday life,
and chaos, violence, and power struggles threaten
the fragmented social order. Under these discourag-
ing circumstances, fundamentalism and sectarianism
are standing temptations because they promise some
measure of community and purpose, however mind-
less. “Competitive factionalism” (p. 4), however, as-
suages our isolation without remedying it. Confor-
mity takes its toll and the thrill of conversion wears
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off, leaving us once again mired in “a culture of the
competitively individualist seeking of the satisfaction
of subjective preferences, without any sources of a
commonwealth andwithout stability or depth of indi-
vidual identity over time, but instead only pervasive
cultural crassness, economic and political exploita-
tion, and individual anomie” (p. 25).
This indictment of modernity will resonate with
readers, among whom I count myself, drawn to
Wordsworth and the other writers who have influ-
enced Eldridge. Nevertheless, Eldridge’s picture of
modern life borders on handwringing nostalgia. It is
so negative that he sometimes needs to remind him-
self that we cannot turn back the clock, nor should
we want to. Even these reminders, however, trail off
into what sounds like remorse, as, for example, in
this attempt to strike a more balanced tone: “The old
dispensations are dead, and for good reason, but a
life lived without any objective dispensations threat-
ens to be bleak, chaotic, and violent, or perhaps nasty,
brutish, and short” (pp. 32–33). Although “enormous
benefits” (p. 32) have accrued from scientific and po-
litical progress, alienation and purposelessness still
loom large.
Literature saves Eldridge’s argument from thor-
oughgoing pessimism. Literature intervenes in the
present not by handing down ironclad moral truths
but by exemplifying how we can work through loss
and disorientationwithout certainty. Literature helps
“to openup some senses of possible commonpurpose
and some routes of possiblemutual engagement, hes-
itantly and nondogmatically, without either denying
or undertaking to rule over the complexities of mod-
ern social life” (p. 4). ‘Hesitantly’ and ‘nondogmati-
cally’ are key terms here. ‘Nondogmatically’ differen-
tiates the provisional insights of literature from the
universally binding moral dictates no longer avail-
able or desirable in modern democratic life. ‘Hes-
itantly’ suggests a noncoercive, tentative means of
expression, an invitation rather than a directive, al-
ways subject to revision and renewal, something akin
to what John Keats had in mind when he counseled
that “man should not dispute or assert but whisper
results to his neighbors” (February 19, 1818 letter).
We get from literary works what Eldridge variously
calls moments of closure, recovery, resolution, calm,
and clarity that enable us not to rest in some fixed
and final worldview but to go on with renewed con-
fidence in our capacity to make ourselves intelligible
and to enter into productive relationships. Literature,
in short, stimulates our “awakening through reflec-
tiveness into new and better commitments, coupled
with a sense of lingering anxieties and uncertainties”
(p. 14)—uncertainties that do not sabotage these com-
mitments but keep them current, saving us from both
dogmatic slumber and narcissistic drifting.
To flesh out these general comments on literature,
Eldridge looks at a play (Tom Stoppard’sArcadia), a
novella (Goethe’s The Sorrows of Young Werther),
an extended lyric poem (Wordsworth’s “Tintern
Abbey”), an unconventional sonnet (Rilke’s “Ar-
chaic Torso of Apollo”), and a long story (W. G.
Sebald’s “Paul Bereyter”). His reading of Arcadia
is too quick and schematic. The play gets reduced to
a cursory illustration of the philosophical reflections
that precede it. His more detailed treatment of the
other literary texts, however, brings out how they
work through crisis, perplexity, and doubt, always
in self-critical, provisional ways, instead of applying
already arrived at solutions. He is especially good
on Goethe’s struggle to find a middle way between
empty conformity and inexpressible authenticity (the
problem that paralyzes Werther), Wordsworth’s os-
cillation between doubt and reassurance in “Tintern
Abbey,” and Sebald’s sense of an individual at once
apart from the world and in it.
Despite Eldridge’s belief in the importance of
literature, he acknowledges its “modest compensa-
tions” (p. 7) and calls the heightened attention paid to
life in literary works “a small thing” (p. 134): “small,”
at least in relation to actionswemight imagine having
more of an impact, such as wholesale political change
or life-altering psychological therapy. Eldridge espe-
cially tempers the expectations we bring to politics,
cautioning that there are no direct political routes to
a better world, or, more specifically, “a community of
reciprocal respect and recognition among free sub-
jects who freely lead lives that are meaningful and
reasonable under shared social institutions” (p. 123).
Although Wordsworth in particular aspires to such a
world, neither electoral politics nor the class struggle
is his way of reaching his social goals, at least not
now. As Eldridge explains, if writing is Wordsworth’s
own way of intervening in the existing world and
envisioning a better one, “that is perhaps because
the world of England in 1798 does not yet readily
admit specific, sustained practices [political practice
included] of wholeheartedness in daily life” (p. 99).
“Not yet” may hold out too much hope for political
action, as Eldridge typically conceives of it. At any
rate, our own world, as Eldridge describes it, seems
much the same as Wordsworth’s, at least in its resis-
tance to political remedies, maybe because the spe-
cific dislocations of modern experience overlay what
Eldridge calls our “permanent human immigrancy or
fracturedness” (p. 7), which in turn ensure our ongo-
ing exposure to “damage, trauma, loss, and in general
to failures to form stable and fulfilling attachments”
(p. 129). Without literature, to be sure, things would
be even worse. But even with literature modern life
looks grim.
Literature for Eldridge thus does not so much
change the world as keep alive our interest in chang-
ing it. In the absence of greater political support,
however, even assigning this seemingly small task to
literary works puts considerable pressure on them.
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With the pains of the world so intractable and the
prospects for social change so dim, it is not clear how
anyone, even someone buoyed by literature, can have
any impact on public life: hence the persistent temp-
tation in modern culture to withdraw and tend one’s
own garden, the very temptation Eldridge wants lit-
erature to combat. I am reminded of Stanley Cavell’s
comment on modern art: “It promises us, not the
reassembly of community, but personal relationships
unsponsored by that community; not the overcoming
of our isolation, but the sharing of that isolation—not
to save the world out of love, but to save love for the
world, until it is responsive again” (Must We Mean
What We Say? [Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1969]). “Un-
til it is responsive again” holds out hope that surfaces
in Eldridge’s argument but cannot gain a foothold in
it (whether Cavell himself earns that hope is another
matter).
Gripped by a similar feeling that isolation can be
shared but not overcome, many modern writers, po-
ets, and artists have taken a fit-though-few approach
to the problem of audience and have scaled back
the responsiveness they expect from the world, some
going so far as to suggest that one caring person is
enough to keep them going as artists (asRobert Low-
ell, for one, told Elizabeth Bishop, “I think I must
write entirely for you”). But the absence of public
impact sooner or later encourages the pursuit of pri-
vate goals, such as keeping love alive for oneself, not
for the world. Eldridge observes how even the ro-
mantic poets that he celebrates “despite their best
intentions for social effect withdraw into rehearsals
of the progress of their own imaginations” (p. 34).
Much the same temptation towithdraw fromdiscour-
aging circumstances that cannot be changed tugs at
Eldridge’s own argument.
I share Eldridge’s appreciation of literature and
admire the exceptionally thoughtful case hehasmade
for its indispensable value. No recent writer has done
a better job showing how imaginative writing can
serve as a lifeline back into the world and keep us
engaged, however fitfully, in it. Nevertheless, a ques-
tion Eldridge asks of romanticism haunts his own
hard-won confidence in literature: “How is imagi-
native art to make a public claim on us?” (p. 35).
Eldridge’s bleak picture of modern life makes that
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Daniel Herwitz’s The Star as Icon: Celebrity in the
Age of Mass Consumption seeks to bring a constel-
lation of concepts developed in the rarified sphere
of aesthetic theory to bear on the arguably extra-
aesthetic phenomenon of Princess Diana as iconic
public figure. The result is a compelling, if at times
surprisingly personal, deployment of familiar aes-
thetic terms in rather less familiar territory. Herwitz
relies on his readers to share the intuition meant
to justify the deployment, attaching this proviso to
his inclusion of Diana and Jackie Onassis with the
likes of Marilyn Monroe, Grace Kelly, and Judy Gar-
land: “If the reader does not share this sense [that
these paradigm examples belong together] he or
she will probably find my book most unsatisfying”
(p. 31). That an aesthetic inquiry begins with an in-
tuition can, in itself, be no criticism, although this
review will suggest that the way this particular intu-
ition retains its force throughout Herwitz’s argument
invites (but does not yet receive) a certain amount of
second-order reflection on the resistance of the icon
to analytic efforts. The book ends as it begins, with
the honest if slightly disappointing assertion that the
author is, “even now, of two minds on the subject,”
an ambivalence that could stand more philosophical
pressure.
The book opens by describing the powerful pub-
lic effect of Diana’s life and death and those qual-
ities that suited her to that role—her strange mix
of beauty and frailty, honesty and privacy, empa-
thy and innocence, royalty and outcast—and draw-
ing parallels between her and the gang of film stars
to which Herwitz intuits she belongs. The narrative
description seems designed to implicate the reader
and invite fascination, and indeed the reading feels
like a bit of guilty pleasure. Given the claim that
what must ground the work to follow is shared in-
tuition, this is the right opening strategy, and it is
not until the second chapter that the analysis proper
begins. There, Herwitz starts to articulate the his-
torical specificity of the phenomenon in question,
which he locates in the particular alchemy of tabloid
news, film, and television, a combination that works
to give rise to and mark out as unique the form of the
icon.
The icon is, as he sees it, comprised of a figure
capable of bearing in tension the opposing forces of
stardom and celebrity, with the former understood
as denoting a kind of transcendence, distance, and
reverence, and the latter as arising from a desire to
see the figure exposed, to know, identify, and even
destroy the object of attention. Like the particular
constellation of media, the individual’s (in this case,
Diana’s) capacity to sustain those forces depends on
accidents of fate, the right combination of biogra-
phy, physiognomy, psychology, and so forth, and his
or her relation to the imaginative and other needs
and desires of the public. Although Herwitz asserts
(and supports with examples) the claim that there is
something particularly feminine about the icon, and
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this fact continues to play a role in the rest of his
argument, he does not subject it to much analytical
scrutiny, which is too bad insofar as it seems a promis-
ing avenue for a book that is in part about the way
in which a person becomes a persona, part subject
who demands respect and distance, part object who
seems to invite identification and even aggression.
Herwitz situates himself by way of a disclaimer
paired with a confession: while Herwitz is “no part
of the Diana cult” (p. 23), he finds himself “stunned
by the star” (p. 24). It is hard to tell whether his be-
ing stunned is a response to the icon’s capacity to
stun others, or if, indeed, he finds himself directly
stunned, that is, implicated in those effects. There is
support for each of these readings, as he describes
watching his mother adopt the comportment of the
star, his father break down in the raptures of iden-
tification, or looking back at his own early and un-
critical love of icons. He writes: “Why not say it? I
am totally ambivalent. . . . I write as a lover of this
genre, but also someone incensed, repulsed, unable
to sort out how this bizarre form took hold of an en-
tire culture, convulsing it, convulsing me” (p. 25). For
the reader, this ambivalence—which leaves Herwitz
both in possession of himself and somehow dispos-
sessed, convulsed—is itself an object of interest. In-
deed, it suggests to me that rather than the language
of genius and fine art, Herwitz might have linked
the experience with the concept of the sublime. One
of the compelling features of Herwitz’s analysis is
the persistence with which this movement between
transcendence and trauma repeats itself, and these
are indeed the twin faces of at least one version of
sublimity.
Since the sublime is a response to what lacks form,
it might help legitimate the extension of an analysis
of filmic stardom to a figure who does not appear
in a single film; Diana’s life is not composed into a
narrative, not given a director’s final aesthetic form.
As it is, Herwitz very aptly chooses Andy Warhol
as the figure that can help us understand the partial
collapse of the distinction between the aesthetic and
the commodity realms. If, to borrow a phrase from
Walter Benjamin, the cult of beauty kept the cul-
tic experience of dissociated pleasure safely behind
museum doors, it is not hard to imagine that the re-
emergence of cultic value in the realms of politics and
commodity culture surprises and even shocks us.
Herwitz’s third chapter, “Therefore Not All Idols
Are American,” consists chiefly of a description of
what he sees as the twin strands, American and
British, stardom and royalty, “posthistorical” and
“historical,” that come to be intertwined in the figure
of Diana (p. 46). This chapter seems largely aimed at
supporting the parenthetical at the start of the next:
“(Royalty has already been discussed).” Nowhere
doesHerwitz submit the strange vestige of premoder-
nity to the same kind of analysis that he provides
for the power he understands to emanate from film.
Diana acquires the aura formerly granted only by
big-screen physiognomic presence, on this account,
by way of “an aesthetic transfer in the public imag-
ination from films to her” (p. 20). Where Benjamin
once thought that the star system borrowed forms
from the older sources in order to restore cultic value
to their product, we are now clearly in a world in
which royalty finds itself constrained to borrow from
Hollywood.
Chapters 4 through 7 provide the core of themedia
analysis, exploring the way various media combine
to serve up our stars as icons: the tabloid press, film,
and television, with chapter 8 exploring the interac-
tion of these media around the work’s central icon,
Diana. Herwitz tracks the emergence of the popu-
lar press, even prior to tabloid star-fascination dis-
playing a new focus on entertainment and its search
for individuals to serve as, in Herwitz’s words, “hu-
man symbols whose terror, anguish, or sudden good
fortune seemed to dramatically summarize some
local event or social problem or social tragedy”
(pp. 50–51). The story as Herwitz tells it has the
film industry trading on that need in order to stabi-
lize the commodity value of its otherwise ephemeral
product.
In his discussion of film, Herwitz complicates the
Benjaminian model in which mechanical reproduc-
tion completes thewithering of aura. In a set ofmoves
prefigured in the discussion of Warhol, he looks to
the power of reproduction to re-create its own ver-
sion of the aura it has displaced, and so he devel-
ops an account of a medium-specific experience that,
in addition to the external marketing usually associ-
ated with the star system, bestows aura: “Benjamin
did not understand that mechanisms of mass repro-
duction might have the liability of generating mass
seduction, charisma, cult of personality” (pp. 65–66).
The means for this re-enchantment never become
precisely clear, but at the very least it relies heavily
on the very faces and gestures of the individuals writ
large on the screen, since these are the ways these
individuals can be said to be present to us, even as
we are in no way present to them. The experience
is both of present and past, an effect that Herwitz
describes as magic that “convulses the imagination”
(p. 78). The star thus presented becomes “more real
than real, and also effervescent, of another galaxy”
(p. 78), a formulation that again reminds one of the
sublime encounter, wherein we encounter both un-
manageable material that, because unmanageable, is
unreal, but because material is more real than what
we are able to shape and constitute conceptually.
Here, however, it becomes clear that instead of what
is unmanageable being paired with the experience of
a self, that would-be manager, it is another self, the
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star, that appears as ungrounded and effervescent
subjectivity.
Herwitz turns to Rear Window (1954) as Hitch-
cock’s reflection on the tension between closeness
and distance in mechanical reproduction, claiming
that “if there is onemoral” to that film, “it is that pho-
tography is the shield for the deployment of fantasies
of omnipotent desire onto the star from thepresumed
safety of viewing” (p. 83). This combination of desire
and terror requires an object that is present but can-
not be had, and although Herwitz remains aware of
the way in which we “revel” in the inaccessibility, he
does not provide an account that might explain our
need to dissociate from our own desire. Here again
we find the trademark formulation of “audience at-
traction, contradictory, fantastical, desiring, perma-
nently stunned” (p. 86), ingredients indeed of a cultic
devotion requiring its object to stand in as symbolic
satisfaction while sustaining sacred opposition to in-
dividual consumption. Given Herwitz’s focus on the
role of physiognomy, it would have been interesting
to see what he makes of the replacement of cult ob-
jectswith cult subjects. In addition to the nuanceddis-
cussion ofRearWindow, the chapter also turns toThe
Philadelphia Story (George Cukor, 1940) in pursuing
its theme of voyeurism, this time in direct connection
with the less auratic voyeurism of the tabloids.
The most remarkable parts of Herwitz’s chapter
on television, “Teleasthetics,” analyzing the oblivi-
ousness of the medium as well as its inducements to
audience identificaion and attachment, are pursued
by way of filmic treatments of television, inThe Bird-
cage (Mike Nichols, 1996) and The Truman Show
(Peter Weir, 1998). When he does not thus ground
his commentary, it becomes slightly unhinged and
musing, straying into the pedestrian as he focuses on
television’s tabloid and talk-show functions. On that
basis, however, he draws an interesting connection
between those open-ended vehicles of familiarity and
contempt (or, sometimes, intimacy) and the formal
structures of a medium that is primarily episodic and
open-ended. Television thus acquires the power to
bestow a different kind of hyperreality from that
conferred by film, that of celebrity. When Herwitz
turns next to discuss Diana, it is in light of her hav-
ing retained the transcendence and dignity of the star
even as she was hounded (and given celebrity) by the
tabloids and television. Herwitz attributes this fact
to a combination of accidental factors and decisions
made by Diana herself, all coming together to pro-
duce an icon. “Film aura, royal halo, and TV talk
show did what they so rarely do: they alchemized
around her” (p. 129).
‘Alchemy,’ ‘magic,’ ‘synergy’: these are the terms
with which Herwitz describes the icon’s stardom and
celebrity, the transfer of filmic aura to a star who
never was in films, as well as the way in which aes-
thetic values occasionally, in cases of iconic value,
come to inform commodity value. It is something of
a relief, then, when Herwitz, in his final chapter, re-
places the terminology with that of “aesthetic luck”
(p. 134). That chapter also includes a strange lament
over the loss of the icon, not of Diana per se, but of
some access to whatever our icon-encounters opened
onto. But that encounter remains, in some deep way,
stupefying; the story ends, as mentioned, with its au-
thor “of twominds,” “still stunned,” “still fascinated”
(p. 143), and the phenomenon still ascribed to luck.
And yet Herwitz writes: “One wants it so that one
can also criticize it. Without it, there is no chance
for art today—not much, anyway, given the rule of
the market” (p. 140). Herwitz has not yet made the
case for critical access to the effects, but he has be-
gun to make one for what he takes the icon to offer
by way of hope “for art today.” When the stars align
to produce an icon, it seems that they also produce
material for artistic mediation, allowing the likes of
Warhol to play at deadening icons and transforming
the everyday into the iconic.
But one is left wondering how we are to explain
our particularly stunning pairing of blood lust and
cultic fascination. That Diana in particular met those
needs was our aesthetic good luck and arguably her
own bad luck. Aesthetic luck is another name for
our seeming dependence on the spontaneous grat-
ification of imaginative needs we otherwise do not
recognize, to describe our claim to subjective pas-
sivity in encountering what we apparently are not
allowed to pursue more consciously, and, as a con-
cept in aesthetic theory, it invites or perhaps even
requires something more aggressive than a descrip-
tive approach.
KATHLEEN EAMON
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woodruff, paul. The Necessity of Theater: The Art
ofWatching andBeingWatched.OxfordUniversity
Press, 2008, xiii + 257 pp., $27.95 cloth.
This is an exceptional book. It breathes a humanity
that we find all too rarely in professional philosoph-
ical writing about the arts, and every page shows the
author’s deep immersion in the culture of ancient
Greece. These are qualities to be admired, even if a
philosopher might have wanted to see more explicit
engagement with current philosophical writing on
the theater, and a general reader might have wanted
fewer classical references.
“Theater” in Paul Woodruff’s sense is some-
thing that goes on whenever anyone watches any-
thing. The necessity of theater in this sense is
a vital necessity—one that flows from our human
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nature. It concerns what is required for our moral
welfare.
Woodruff defines theater as the art by which hu-
man beings make or find human action worth watch-
ing, in a measured time and place. The definition
recurs like a refrain through the book as the author
successively unpacks its key terms. It turns out that he
has nonstandard and value-loaded understandings of
many of these terms.
An art, writes Woodruff, is by definition a kind of
learning that guides human actions (p. 42). Of course,
much of what empirically happens in theaters does
not offer much by way of guiding human action. So,
while his definition of theater includes things beyond
what is customarily thought of as theater, it is also
narrower than what people ordinarily understand by
the word. This narrowness of focus will be frustrat-
ing for those philosophers who are looking for a gen-
eral account of theater—particularly those who are
looking for a value-free account—but it will not mat-
ter to those who (like Woodruff himself) are mainly
interested in demonstrating the moral utility of the-
ater. That thesis does not require that all theater be
morally useful, so in this respect a narrow definition
does no harm.
To describe the essential activities of theater as
watching and its converse might suggest that that
activity is a visual one. But Woodruff explains that
watching is not exclusively visual. It just means pay-
ing a certain kind of attention. And the kind of at-
tention we ideally pay is caring attention. “Our need
to watch theater grows from our need to care about
other people” (p. 20). Thus, for Woodruff, characters
play an essential role in theater, and a character, as
Woodruff means it, is by definition worth watching.
When he defines theatrical action as “worth watch-
ing,” he means not just that the audience thinks it is
worth watching but that “in the best cases” it actu-
ally is good for the audience. So, he can conclude, “If
theater is not beneficial to you, you should change
your life—or else change the theater to which you are
exposed” (p. 68).
The measured time and place referred to in the
definition of theater need not be any specific kind of
time or place. All the same, any given time or place
of theater must be subject to limits.
He distinguishes a narrower sense of “theater” as
art theater (“art” as in the fine arts, not in the sense
in which theater is defined as an art). He argues that
we need theater in his broad sense but that we do
not need it in the narrow sense. All the same, he
holds that there is an important relation between art
theater and what we might call the theater of life.
The former gives us practice in doing things that the
latter requires, namely, the art of watching. Viewed
in this way—through the spectrum of the theater of
life—art theater is argued to possess a superior value
in comparison with other specific forms of theater
such as watching sports events or weddings. It is a
better sort of ethical training.
One could agree that art theater is useful relative
to this ethical end. However, it would not then follow
that when art theater is good as art, it is good art
because it serves this ethical end: to believe that this
followswouldbe to confuseWoodruff’s senseof “art”
with the sense of “art” in which we speak of the
fine arts. Nor would it follow that it was art theater’s
purpose to serve that end, or even that art theater
had any single purpose: the possibility would remain
open that art theater was useful or even necessary
relative to other ends.
Particular topics discussed in the book include the
underlying differences between tragedy and comedy,
the nature of mimesis, and the nature of the audi-
ence’s emotional response to theater. Woodruff ad-
vances a novel account of emotion in mimetic the-
ater, which he counterposes to Walton’s account in
terms of make-believe. He analyzes emotion in four
components: the subject (who has the emotion), the
first object (toward which the emotion is directed),
the second object (on behalf of whom the emotion is
felt), and the action (toward the doing of which the
emotion impels the subject). According toWoodruff,
a genuine emotion may have as its object a person
whom we know not to be actual, and need not is-
sue in action though it must make us feel like acting.
He compares the audience’s emotional response to
a character onstage with the feeling of genuine grief
in real life: in both cases we feel like doing what we
know cannot be done.
This account of emotion lies at the heart of the
book. For Woodruff, understanding theater requires
an appropriate emotional response and depends on a
complex relationship between actions presented on
the stage and the lives of the spectators. And be-
cause of the linkage between emotion and the ethi-
cal, understanding theater is irreducibly ethical in na-
ture: “A good audience understands what it watches,
through an emotional attunement that is governed
by ethical virtue” (p. 224).
Woodruff’s account of emotion also underpins his
classificationof types of theater,which is basedon the
aimed-at emotional response. The aim could be con-
gruence between the spectators’ emotions and those
of the characters (where what the spectator feels is
similar to what the character feels—as in theater of
presence or theater of memory or theater of tonal
sympathy). Or it could be identification (as in the-
ater of fantasy). Or again, the aim could be cognitive
empathy (“the experience ofwell-informed emotions
on behalf of another person” [p. 183]). Theater of
the first two types “leads to bad watching” (p. 180).
Brechtian epic theater is one example of the third
type.
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Not discussed are some topics that a philosopher
of the arts might expect to find in a book on the phi-
losophy of theater. These include the aesthetic prop-
erties of theatrical works and performances—things
like the craft of acting and of stage presentation in
general, or the imaginative appeal of theatrical per-
formance. Woodruff makes out that it would be a
mere “technical dodge” for an audience to pay at-
tention to “how the art is practiced by those who per-
form”without caring for the characters (p. 150). Also
not discussed is opera. However, the book’s classifi-
cation of types of theater is perhaps suggestive of
ways to analyze the different kinds of contribution
music makes to audiences’ emotional engagement in
opera.
If the book lacks someofwhat a philosopher of the
artsmight expect, it is still repletewith good things. In
addition to mounting a persuasive argument for the
ethical necessity of theater in the broad sense, the
book gives us a mass of richly described imaginative
examples, an original treatment of the role of emo-
tion in theater, numerous valuable insights into the
workings of Sophocles’ and Shakespeare’s plays, and
percipient reflections on the conditions that would





friedberg, anne. The Virtual Window: FromAlberti
to Microsoft. MIT Press, 2006, 448 pp., 113 b&w
illus., $34.95 cloth.
In an era in which screens have become variable dis-
play formats, film has become a storage device, and
spectators have become“users,” theorists of themov-
ing image are confrontedwith central questions:what
is cinema, what is the object of inquiry for film and
visual studies, and what does the ontological and aes-
thetic trajectory of new media say about the human
subject in the twenty-first century? The majority of
attempts at theorizing the ramifications of new tech-
nology contradictorily revert to allegorical uses of
narrative analysis in lieu of what authors claim to
be a philosophical consideration of medial theory
or formal analysis. A rare exception to this is Anne
Friedberg’s The Virtual Window: FromAlberti to Mi-
crosoft, which complements a theoretical argument
with an engaging and substantial history of visual
technologies.
Returning constantly to Marshall McLuhan’s
adage, “the medium is the message,” Friedberg (now
chairing the Critical Studies Department at the Uni-
versity of Southern California) makes a very strong
case for the multidimensionality of medial theory
and formal analysis, a complex understanding of the
imagistic that, she claims, we have been ushered into
by our cinematic history. Claiming that in the post-
filmic or postcinematic landscape, cinema “merely
forms an originary visual system for a complexly di-
verse set of postcinematic visualities” (p. 6), Fried-
berg ultimately traces a variant set of analogies for
the architectural window—the perspectival frame, the
cinematic screen, and the computer window—up to
the end of the twentieth century, at which point the
architectural role of the window changed “alongside
the development of its virtual analogs—the screens
of film, television, and the computer” (p. 103). Her
goal in this study is to provide “an account of the sub-
jectivities of people in the most mediated provinces
in the first world” (p. 245): in other words, to trace
the evolution of hyper-mediated Western symbolic
forms in conjunction with our existential and percep-
tual condition.
Evoking the central tenet of Wittgenstein’s phi-
losophy of language, that knowledge is limited by
the language one has to express it, Friedberg affords
a blunt revelation to what has long lingered as a point
of obscurity or even denial in critical theory and vi-
sual studies, which is the frequent interchange be-
tween literal and metaphorical language without an
alteration in rhetorical style. In other words, the use
of a word in one moment as concrete term, the next
as metaphor.
In the opening pages, she clarifies what she will
later describe as “a split optic, a historical paral-
lax” with which the book is engaged: “Many of the
key terms in this book—window, perspective, frame,
screen, architecture—operate in both metaphoric
and literal registers, and their meanings frequently
slip between the dual functions of philosophical
paradigm and representational device” (p. 243).
In an attempt to maintain this clarity of distinc-
tion, Friedberg structures her book according to a
framework that follows the general logic: (1) formal
history, (2) critical theory, (3) philosophical ramifica-
tions.Each largermeta-section (“TheWindow,” “The
Frame,” “The Screen”) concerns a mode of ‘virtual,’
a complex word that is used often and often haphaz-
ardly in visual studies today, and which very few, if
any, theorists have actually defined clearly in relation
to their own work. Friedberg succeeds most lucidly
in this endeavor, tying her bundle of metaphors to-
gether under the notion that the virtual can be under-
stood as the approximation of the real, and that such
technological inventions as perspective, the camera
obscura, and analog machines have been driven by a
fascination with formal ways of realizing this approx-
imation (p. 60).
For Friedberg these historical developments are
directly tied to sociocultural questions of subjectiv-
ity and agency, representation and power, and thus
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are extendable through critical theory to various so-
cial, political, and economic studies. She herself tends
toward an implicitly Marxist–feminist approach, or
at least these are the two diminutive ideological
stances that seem the most recurrent in her work,
though it must be pointed out that The Virtual Win-
downever fundamentallymakes use of an ideological
argument.
BeginningwithAlberti’s notion of thewindowand
the Renaissance method for arranging perspective,
Friedberg launches what could be considered aMod-
ern Renaissance inquiry into the last five hundred
years of visual representation. Her central questions
are founded in this opening part: How does this tech-
nique position the spectator? What type of view is
constructed, and what type of subject does this both
signify and determine?
It comes as no surprise that Friedberg uses Al-
berti’s frame to introduce thepost-Renaissanceprob-
lematic of fixed subjectivity and a static, monocular
point of view. The window, she points out in rather
Panofsky-esque terms, provides “not a realism of
subject matter but a separate spatial and temporal
view,” as well as a framing device for the geometrics
of perspective (p. 32). ExtendingAlberti’s window to
Du¨hrer’s notion of the veil, Friedberg expounds upon
the use of such techniques to construct a separation
between the viewer and the represented world that
rests at an objectifying, measurable distance: in other
words, a classical division between subject and object
that has served as the basis for most Western epis-
temology, as Friedberg then proceeds to elaborate
through a parallel analysis of Cartesian subjectivity.
However, Friedberg points out that even Renais-
sance art contains examples of multi-frame imagery,
or imagery that escapes this unidirectional subject,
foreshadowing the cinematic with itsmultiple tempo-
ral and subjective planes within the same collective
space. It is only attempts to reduce such forms to a
visual and subjective singularity, such as through the
Albertian window or Du¨hrer’s veil, that allow us to
arrive at the central object of critique in what Fried-
berg calls the philosophical paradigm of perspective.
In the second part, “The Frame,” Friedberg sets up
an impressive challenge to most twentieth-century
critical historiographies of perspective. She cites
Jonathon Crary’s Techniques of the Observer (MIT
Press, 1990), which provides an analysis of the phe-
nomenological difference between perspective and
the camera obscura, which could be considered an
analog form as opposed to perspective, concluding,
“[T]he phenomenological differences between the
experience of perspectival construction and the pro-
jection of the camera obscura are not even compara-
ble” (p. 66).
While the unquestioned genealogy from perspec-
tive to camera obscura and on to photographic and
film cameras has provided a point of agreement for
such different film theorists asAndre´Bazin and Jean-
Louis Baudry, Hubert Damisch argues in The Origin
of Perspective (MIT Press, 1994) that perspective is
rather a paradigm, a structure that can traverse his-
tory as opposed to being part of a techno-ideological
genealogy.
Friedberg uses this opportunity to challenge cer-
tain staples of apparatus theory and ideological (of-
ten Marxist–psychoanalytic) theory. For example,
the editing code of suture, in which techniques of
shot/reverse-shot are employed to give the spectator
the illusion of playing a central signifying role in the
film sequence, could also be seen as part of the cin-
ematic frame’s role as a “container for the fractured
multiplicity of spatial and temporal perspectives in-
herent in the cinematic moving image” (p. 85). Even
in the case of suture, Freidberg points out, shots fol-
lowing narrative continuity are from differently po-
sitioned views.
Friedberg’s lucidity and creativity come across
particularly strongly in this part of the book, in
which she offers an entirely alternate theory of
cinematic expression: whereas many film histori-
ans accept the paradigmatic division of cinema be-
tween Me´lie`s and the Lumie`re brothers, between
spectacular imagination and documentary realism,
Friedberg instead points to an even more originary
schizophrenic paradigm, that between Edward Muy-
bridge and Etienne-Jules Marey. Friedberg notes
these two godfathers of the moving image for their
fundamentally different notions of addingmovement
ormotion to the photographic image, and she stakes a
convincing claim to these two paradigms as being still
visible today in an array of digital imagery. Whereas
Marey’s images are temporally fractured (multiple
exposures in the same frame), Muybridge’s famous
horse race lays the groundwork for multi-frame tech-
nology (pp. 90–92).
Friedberg cleverly provides this rather original
paradigm as a starting place for her attempt to
frame cinema in its historical place between the
post-Renaissance forms of representation and the
postphotographic forms of digital reproduction. As
opposed to Deleuze’s situation of the cinematic frag-
mentation of subjectivity as a modern phenomenon
in line with postwar history and philosophy, Fried-
berg sets it up as the necessary predecessor to the
“Age of Windows.” Supported by a survey history of
glassmaking, window production, and architectures
of the transparent, we are ushered into the twentieth-
century prominence of cubism as an overriding
artistic, symbolic, and existential paradigm. Once
constructed to provide light and ventilation, the ar-
chitectural window came to be used primarily as a
means for framing and view: in other words, as a con-
struct of subjectivity and perceptual structure.
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However, in twentieth-century culture, the win-
dow is somewhat replaced by—or doubled up in the
form of—the screen. “The Screen,” the third ma-
jor section of The Virtual Window, focuses on the
essence of cinema’s magic. Building upon theorists
such as Arnheim andMu¨nsterberg, Friedberg argues
that cinema’s appeal is not in fact through the repro-
duction of reality, but through its virtuality, its sug-
gestivity of the objects that are not in fact present.
“[T]he astonishment of cinema,” she writes, “de-
rives from a magical metamorphosis rather than a
seamless reproduction of reality” (p. 155). Fried-
berg uses this premise to launch into a history of
cinemas and picture-houses, discussing the different
ways in which the praxis for this metamorphosis—the
screen—hasbeen conceptualized, construed, and con-
structed. She traces this up to the present-day com-
puter screen (dubbed the “cathode window” by Paul
Virilio), in which architecture dematerializes and di-
mensions are lost altogether.
Friedberg discusses the multiplicity of the com-
puter screen’s “windows” as the genealogical exten-
sion of the cinematic sequence, and likens this screen
to the format of digital cinema, discussing the lega-
cies of Marey and Muybridge in a wide assortment
of contemporary cinema, television, and other me-
dial texts. Ultimately, this is where Friedberg crosses
over from historical analysis to contemplating the ex-
istential human condition in the hyper-mediated dig-
ital age, thus establishing a humanistic relevance for
the implications found in the other books addressed
here. If we accept the argument that perception is
conditioned by representational habits, she writes in
evocation of Panofsky and a long line of twentieth-
century philosophers and art theorists, “then our
new mode of perception is multiple and fractured”
(p. 193).
While this does not necessarily include aspects
of cognitive neurology or Gestalt psychology that
might enhance such a claim, Friedberg’s platform
is most convincing, and her examples from the tex-
tual practices of high culture to the quotidian habits
of common experience offer an insight into the in-
evitable resonance of our symbolic formats and our
behavioral practices. Discussing the “interface cul-
ture” (p. 230) that has replacedword-based program-
ming with graphical and sensorial interface, Fried-
berg concludes that the multiscreen interactivity of
our technology and the multitasking pace of our so-
ciocultural norms are interlinked in a first-world civ-
ilization that has become postperspectival, postcin-
ematic, and post-televisual. That is to say, a human
subjectivity that is no longer framed in single im-
ages with fixed centrality, no longer projected onto a
screen surface, and no longer unidirected in a model
of sender and receiver.
Friedberg concludes through this that the frag-
mentation of individual subjectivity is interrelated
with the achievement of new speeds of access to in-
formation, or what she calls “deep histories of image
and text” (p. 242). This mode of storing informa-
tion and accessing it, this omnipresent realization of
Bergson’s virtual memory, provides an Escher-esque
spatiotemporal multiplicity in which our means of
recording, representing, and referencing grow expo-
nentially with each virtual self-reproduction. This is a
condition, Friedberg seems to imply, that cinema has
prepared us for: “The window’s metaphoric bound-
ary is no longer the single frame of perspective—
as beholders of multiple-screen ‘windows,’ we now
see the world in spatially and temporally fractured
frames, through ‘virtual windows’ that rely more on
the multiple and simultaneous than on the singular
and sequential” (p. 243).
Friedberg’s conclusion is not one of eulogy or
lament, cynicism or pessimism; in fact, what is in
the end so moving about her work is its enthusiasm
for the monumental change concurrently being ex-
perienced by our modes of visual expression and the
scholarly field of visual studies.
HUNTER VAUGHAN
Film and Media Studies
Washington University
herrington, susan. On Landscapes. New York:
Routledge, 2009, x + 150 pp., 25 b&w illus., $19.95
paper.
This compact, crisply written book is part of the
Thinking in Action series edited by Simon Critchley
from the New School University and Richard Kear-
ney from Boston College. The purpose of the series
is to persuade students to explore issues that are rele-
vant to theworldwe live in today. Some readersmight
then become enticed and pursue the subject further,
perhaps even professionally. Others may gain insight
into heretofore unexplored territory.
The titles of chapters 1 through 3 address fun-
damental questions: (1) Who designs landscapes?
(2) What can landscapes represent? (3) Are land-
scapes natural?On the surface, these questions sound
simple, but they are actually quite complex. The
many answers Herrington supplies to each question
seem to lead effortlessly to the next essential ques-
tion. The s in the word ‘landscapes’ is important be-
cause she discusses a multitude of landscapes, from
Martha Schwartz’s Bagel Garden in Boston to Bar-
rier Park in East London. She travels fromCanada to
the United States, England, Scotland, Germany, and
France, with forays into Italy along with a few inter-
esting observations on gardens and parks in Japan.
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The landscape examples she chose are significantly
different from each other, in part to suggest to read-
ers that landscapes can be absolutely fascinating as
isolated entities and as individual works of art.
Herrington notes in chapter 2 that we sometimes
perceive landscapes by what has been written about
them. Not too long ago, landscape designers were
urged to imitate nature (so much for Schwartz’s
Bagel Garden or Andy Goldsworthy’s marvelous
creations). She cites Horace Walpole’s written cri-
tique of William Kent’s decision to plant dead trees
in Kensington Garden, presumably among the live
ones but that “hewas soon laughedout of this excess”
(p. 44). I think Herrington would have enjoyed a re-
cent exhibit at theGreaterRestonArts Center inRe-
ston, Virginia, entitled “Sleeping Tree,” an installa-
tion choreographed by Shinji Turner-Yamamoto. The
gallery housed a large, dead dogwood tree resting on
its side. Its leaves were gone, but the reddish clay
earth remained attached to the roots. Some earth sat
on the wood floor. Small Japanese painted ferns were
planted in the earth and on the roots and branches
of the tree, which was sprayed every day with water.
Sunlight filtered through the windows. New growth
appeared, changing from day to day.What must have
surprised visitors as they walked around the instal-
lation was its abstract sculptural beauty from every
possible angle. Theurgeof visitors to caress thewood,
to smell the ferns and moist soil, suggested a certain
affection developing for the installation.
In chapter 4, Herrington discusses memory and
emotion, focusing her attention on ruins, ancient
as well as nineteenth- and twentieth-century ones.
A provocative example, Germany’s Duisburg North
Park, received a lot of international press when it
opened to the public in the mid-1990s. The landscape
architectural firm Peter Latz and Partners convinced
the client not to tear down the old foundry walls of
the Thyssen factory, alongwith the blast furnaces and
railway scaffolding. That in itself was a major coup.
Few clients, even today, can be persuaded to look
at ruins as a sophisticated and elegant aspect of the
overall design concept. Most still prefer to start over
using a clean slate.
Herrington rightly points out that, in the twenti-
eth century, emotion was put in the closet and re-
mained there, even though a number of scientists in
the 1990s (she cites neuroscientist Antonio Dama-
sio) suggested that cognition and emotions are di-
rectly related and that they influence our perception.
Of course they do. How can anyone walk by Maya
Lin’s Vietnam Memorial in Washington, D.C., with-
out touching the black granite surface and the names
of those who died? We are, after all, walking ever
so gently into the (Chinese-inspired) gravesite even
though it is not on a hillside. We see ourselves re-
flected in the granite, and it is indeed silent, as Her-
rington suggests. A similar silence permeated the ur-
ban landscape of downtown New York City immedi-
ately after September 11. White and pale gray ashes
floated along the streets among the flowers and pho-
tos of lost loved ones. Many photos still remain on a
chain-link fence in the West Village and elsewhere.
Chapter 5 focuses on the value of imagination
to our lives. We simply cannot afford to lose it
once we become employed adults. Yet many people
pride themselves that they have “outgrown” imagi-
nation. Herrington demonstrates its importance by
discussing the ideas of the inventor of the kinder-
garten, Friedrich Froebel. Froebel did not emphasize
scientific labeling. Instead, childrenwere encouraged
to make connections when visiting gardens and land-
scapes, like connections between birds and seasons,
which then raised further questions about migration
and climate. She also mentions landscape architect
IanMcHarg’s overlay map system, which enabled ar-
chitects and landscape architects to begin to under-
stand the lay of the land—what could or should not
be accomplished on a specific piece of land. It did not
eliminate human mistakes or greed. Developers still
remove huge swathes of trees to create townhouses
and fill in ponds that welcome migratory birds in or-
der to build parking lots. Versions of what McHarg
conceived in the 1960s can now be viewed on com-
puters, thereby providing a useful picture of changes
over time, plus a good argument to persuade devel-
opers to revise their initial mathematical models of
too many buildings on too little land.
Herrington efficiently moves from chapter to
chapter without fanfare or drama. She steadfastly
keeps on her intended path, ending with chapter
6, “Aesthetic Experience.” She hopes that students
will leave their computers temporarily to experience
landscapes with their bodies and minds. She reminds
students that “many landscapes are intentionally de-
signed to communicate via a range of senses, which
are absent when presented only two-dimensionally”
(p. 114). She suggests that the significance of human
sensibility should not be underestimated. We tend
to ignore the value of our senses until they start to
fade or we lose them. As we move through designed
landscapes, we perceive changes from millisecond to
millisecond, enjoying and appreciating our surround-
ings. Throughout history, the art, poetry, and, believe
it or not, recorded picnics seen in paintings from
Japan to the Ottoman empire, reveal that many cul-
tures treasured their landscaped gardens and spent
quality time there.
Finally, my compliments to the anonymous de-
signer of this handy 5 × 7.75 inch (13 × 19.5 cm)
pocket book that students can easily slip into their
book bags or even their pockets. The choice of type-
face is sophisticated and easy to read and the ju-
dicious boldface works well to keep our attention.
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Dominic McIver Lopes’s cover photo instantly grabs
us, suggesting that we climb what appears to be new
concrete steps framed by wild grasses that emerge
from the title, On Landscapes, and travel directly to
the author’s name, Susan Herrington. Very nice.
BARBARA SANDRISSER
Architectural and Environmental Aesthetics
New York City
morgan, ed. The Aesthetics of International Law.
University of Toronto Press, 2007, 272 pp., $55.00
cloth.
International law is amodern—indeed, a modernist—
enterprise. In the Middle Ages, we are sometimes
told, there were no international relations proper,
because there were, in effect, no nations proper:
there was no crisp way to divide foreign from do-
mestic, because sovereignty was fragmentary, over-
lapping, parcelized. On this view, a unified and
territorial concept of sovereignty was as much a
necessary precondition for the emergence of a
distinctively international sphere as it was for the
emergence of a distinctively national one. The
Hobbesian division (inside: order and security; out-
side: chaos and naked force) ostensibly clarified the
normative underpinnings of each sphere. No wonder
classical legal positivists, John Austin, for example,
did not think international law any sort of law at all:
no international habit of obedience meant no inter-
national sovereign, and where there is no sovereign,
there is no law. International custom, to be sure, and
international force, of course—but international law?
Not really.
But perhaps Austin’s argument says more about
the limitations of legal positivism than about the lim-
itations of international law. The dream of interna-
tional law has ever been to trump or otherwise mit-
igate the effects of brute force in the international
sphere—to tame its lawlessness, to bring it to norma-
tive heel in someway or other. Alas, this is easier said
than done. Consider a Wilsonian ideal like national
self-determination. It would seem a lovely solution
to questions of universality and particularity: every
nationality gets its own nation, and each nation is
a full-fledged member of the international commu-
nity. France, Iraq, Indonesia, and Sudan, for example,
have the same sort of sovereignty, the same interna-
tional legal personality, the same international rights
and privileges. Well, it sounds nice, I suppose, but to
understate things just a bit, it is not altogether clear
how exactly to determine what is to count as a na-
tion—or who exactly gets to do the counting. Add
colonialism and its aftermath to the mix and things
become quite messy indeed, maybe even intractable.
As Ed Morgan notes, “As international law contin-
ues to rewrite its own conceptual past, it becomes
clear that nationalism could be portrayed as presid-
ing over a defeated universalism just as easily as inter-
nationalism has been portrayed as the conqueror of
parochialism” (p. 130). Not for nothing has Stephen
Krasner analyzed sovereignty—in all its multivalent
majesty—as a sort of “organized hypocrisy.”
So international law is a mess, a mess that will not
be tidied. This very messiness is what makes EdMor-
gan’s The Aesthetics of International Law such an in-
triguing project. Morgan hopes to illuminate interna-
tional law by considering it as an aesthetic endeavor,
reading it through the lens of modernist literature.
This seems promising: after all, some messes are glo-
rious and beautiful, their lack of neatness part of their
allure—part, indeed, of their aesthetic power. Mod-
ernism produced a number of such messes, and what
is more, some of the conflicting and cantankerous
features of modernist literature resemble the con-
flicting and cantankerous features of international
law. As Morgan notes, “Through its seemingly ex-
hausting repetition international law is effectively
replenished” (p. 6), just as modernist literature is.
If, as many have said, the nineteenth-century novel is
a mode appropriate to nationalism, to narrating the
nation, then perhaps the modernist novel, in all its
variegated glory, is a mode appropriate to telling a
more bewildering—a more international—story.
So Morgan’s aim is interesting. Indeed, more than
interesting: a book that managed to explore and ex-
plain international law as an aesthetic phenomenon
would be an amazing achievement, one that would
sparkle both aesthetically and legally. Sadly, this book
is not quite that book. At its best, The Aesthetics of
International Law makes some provocative gestures
toward such a book, and maybe the most generous
way to read Morgan’s work is as a wry, somewhat
patchy prolegomenon to some future aesthetic anal-
ysis of international law. At its worst, the book can
seempedestrian, with its SparkNotes-style biographi-
cal blurbs about JohnConrad andBertoltBrecht, and
its massive apparatus of law review-style endnotes—
over one hundred pages of endnotes. The book mas-
querades at times as a dusty law tome, but its charms
and its power lie elsewhere—so let us try to catch a
few glimpses of the nimble little book lurking here
behind a slightly stiff fac¸ade.
Just how aesthetic are the aesthetics Morgan pro-
poses? In one obvious sense, not very: certainly the
book develops no systematic aesthetic theory. In-
stead, each of Morgan’s chapters pairs some issue
in international law with some literary text or texts,
with the hope of illuminating the former by means
of the latter. The results are uneven. At times the
literary analogies seem forced, arbitrary, and unhelp-
ful: the discussion of the Cyclops section of Joyce’s
Ulysses (pp. 45–72), for example, falls flat, adding
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little to Morgan’s discussion of conflict of laws. Even
some of the more promising analogies seem to stall:
the discussion ofNabokov’s Invitation to aBeheading
(pp. 104–115), while engaging as a bit of literary crit-
icism, never quite connects with Morgan’s examina-
tion of the complex issues surrounding extradition of
a potentially “death-eligible” defendant from a juris-
diction that forbids capital punishment to a jurisdic-
tion that permits it. Indeed,Morgan’smethod is quite
risky: a chaptermay be interesting in twoways—as lit-
erary criticism and as legal analysis; witnessMorgan’s
discussion of Kafka’s “In the Penal Colony” and ex-
traterritorial criminal law (pp. 73–94)—and still come
up short as a revelation of the aesthetic character of
some aspect of international law.
ButwhenMorgan’smethodworks, it works nicely:
the chapter onBorges and thebreakupofYugoslavia,
for example, is splendid. As Morgan explains, “The
Borgesian perspective helps bring into focus inter-
national law’s relationship to the world of poli-
tics it purports to govern” (p. 117). The question
is an important one: can the political confusion of
a massive national breakup—fraught with bitter se-
cessionist movements, widespread strife and unrest,
atrocities, ethnic cleansing, and all the rest of it—be
somehow subjected, even partially, to the rule of law?
“In confirming the extinction of one state and pro-
tecting the territorial interests of several new ones,
and in defining new humanitarian law and indicting
war criminals, the international system promised to
rise to a difficult occasion” (p. 116). The engagement
of international law with the breakup of Yugoslavia
seemed to many optimistic observers “a noticeable
change from the paralysis with which international
law greeted prior instances of political violence”
(p. 118). Instead of dithering helplessly among an
array of equally unpalatable options like some le-
gal equivalent of Buridan’s ass, international law re-
sponded quickly and at least somewhat effectively
to the complex situation: as Morgan notes (p. 118),
the decisions of the European Arbitration Commis-
sion recognized the rapidly changing political reali-
ties on the ground—the international sovereignty of
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, taken
seriously as a fact of international law by the com-
mission in November 1991, had vanished as a legal
reality by the time of the commission’s Opinion No.
8, issued on July 4, 1992. Perhaps the law had at last
become flexible enough, dynamic enough, to keep up
with politics—and if the law could, paceCarl Schmitt,
keep up with political emergencies, then some wor-
ries about the limits of the rule of law might be put
to rest.
So, at any rate, runs the perennial dream. Against
this dream, Morgan juxtaposes a reading of “The
Secret Miracle,” a Borges story: “a story of a man
whose fate depends on both making progress and
maintaining the status quo” (p. 119). In “The Secret
Miracle,” the protagonist Hladik is at work on a play
that, if completed, will serve as a theodicy, justifying
the existence of God—and of Hladik as well. It will
take Hladik a year to finish the play, but he does not
have a year: he is standing before a Nazi firing squad.
But just before his execution,Hladik receives a secret
reprieve: time pauses, or pauses for everyone and
everything save Hladik (and God, presumably)—
“For a full year, the sergeant’s arm hangs in the air
giving the order to the squad. . . . During this time,
Hladik . . . completes his play line by line in his
head” (p. 119). When the secret year is over and the
secret play is finished, the execution takes place, as
scheduled.
But how does this illuminate legal decisions gov-
erning the dissolution of Yugoslavia? To put it very
briskly, the commission at once refused to take in-
ternational recognition of some former Yugosla-
vian entities as establishing international sovereignty,
while at the same time taking the announcement
of sovereignty by some former Yugoslavian entities
to be sufficient to establish their international le-
gal sovereignty. Sometimes empirical political real-
ities—“the facts on the ground” (p. 122)—determined
whether sovereignty obtained; in other cases, such
sovereignty depended on the “constitutional provi-
sions of the defunct” entity, the Socialist Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia (p. 123). But this is the very con-
stitution that, given empirical political realities on the
ground, the commission treated as no longer in force
in the other cases. Confusing, to say the least, but no
more so, really, than “The Secret Miracle”: “Much as
the commission never ‘really’ knows whether legal
frontiers are a product of violent political action or a
product of the legal system’s restraint on further uni-
lateral action, Hladik never ‘really’ knows whether
he has been shot and the peaceful year is an illusion
or whether he has been granted a reprieve and his
death remains a bad dream” (p. 123). Put another
way, is the secret miracle enough to bracket the Nazi
regime—to keep Nazi atrocities from attaining a kind
of metaphysical stature, revealing God to be evil or
powerless—or is the secret miracle just a fantasy that
there exist higher realities more lasting and power-
ful than the ugly political force that dominates the
moment? Similarly, are the international legal deci-
sions dealing with Yugoslavia’s breakup enough to
serve as a sort of theodicy for international law, or do
they rather reveal international law’s powerlessness
and complicity with evil? OnMorgan’s view, no clear
answer is forthcoming, but it is the “ability of inter-
national law to provide its own continuous suspense
that keeps the dream alive in the face of its successive
deaths. Indeed, it is nothing but the innate creativity
of its narrative that allows international law to res-
urrect itself with each successive political episode”
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(p. 132). The dream of international law is an aes-
thetic dream, a dream that is magically replenished
with each disappointment.
The ideas Morgan explores in his Borges chap-
ter echo throughout the book. Like the ending of
Thomas Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49, interna-
tional law is forever “just shy of revelation . . . still
waiting for the sense of it all to emerge” (p. 148). Like
the hotel in Last Year at Marienbad (Alain Resnais,
1961), international law is “both ornate . . . and decay-
ing” (p. 167), and every attempt at law reform must,
in order to succeed, present itself as something that
has already happened, long ago—“as if this is how it
had always been” (p. 165). The international law of
terrorism, like Poe’s Brevet Brigadier General John
A. B. C. Smith, is “both grand and vacuous” (p. 14):
in trying to do too much—in trying to sort out polit-
ical criminality, terrorism, and nonterrorist political
violence—international law comes close to exhaust-
ing the international/domestic distinction on which it
rests, comes close to using itself up. Like T. S. Eliot’s
“TheWaste Land,” the 1982Convention on the Inter-
national Law of the Sea uses historical exhaustion as
a means for overcoming historical exhaustion: “The
message of the text is to encourage the reader to
overcome the failures of history by actively pursuing
. . . a highly sensitized, historically aware reading”
(p. 43) of the poem—and of theConvention. One gets
the point: the frustrations of international law are,
for Morgan, the aesthetics of international law.
The frustrations can indeed be fascinating, and
the aesthetic contemplation of these frustrations is
doubtless a crucial part of international law’s ever-
belated self-understanding. Nevertheless, at times
one detects a yearning in Morgan for a way out of
the frustration, as when he laments the “almost pre-
dictably timid” (p. 105) response of Canadian judges
to extradition requests. (Morgan makes many fasci-
nating remarks about the international legal person-
ality of Canada—perhaps that should be the topic of
his next book.) This yearning is part and parcel of
the aesthetics of frustration, no doubt. But as Martti
Koskenniemi—a thinker Morgan oddly never cites—
suggests in his devastating and brilliant The Gentle
Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of Interna-
tional Law 1870–1960 (Cambridge University Press,
2004), the frustrations of international law need not
be static, but part of series of widening horizons, an
ever deeper and perhaps more rococo understanding
that, however tired and tiring, is a bit more playful
and a bit less sour than one’s never-ending memories
of the hotel in Marienbad.
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